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INTRODUCTION
Biotechnology has become one of the key technologies of the 21st
century. The rapid evolution of biomedical research has raised expecta-
tions of finding ever better treatment to an increased number of illnesses.
Due to the complexity of biomedical research, researchers-scientists
working in academia and in commercial enterprises alike-need access
to numerous resources for their projects. Concerns have been expressed
that increased patenting of upstream inventions, especially of research
tools, has led to a situation of blocking patents and has impaired research
and development of new or better therapeutic products.
Responding to these concerns, proposals have been made to facili-
tate access to the necessary inputs by excluding upstream inventions
Research Tool Patents
from patentability' through: a more stringent application of the pat-
entability requirements, 2  a broadening of the experimental use
exemption,3 or compulsory licensing of research tools. 4 Except for the
exclusion of research tools from patentability,5 all approaches are worthy
of closer consideration and should best be pursued consistent with each
other and with the rationale of the patent system. Whereas an introduc-
tion of compulsory licensing provisions into U.S. patent law seems
I. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental
Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. I, 46
n.233, 47 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Cynthia D. Lopez-Beverage, Should Congress Do Something About Up-
stream Clogging Caused by the Deficient Utility of Expressed Sequence Tag Patents?, 10 J.
TECH. L. & POL'Y 35 (2005) (arguing in favor of a heightened utility standard); Richard R.
Nelson, The Market Economy, and the Scientific Commons, 33 RES. POL'Y 455, 466 (2004)
(arguing in favor of a stricter application of the utility requirement to keep open the scientific
commons: "A stricter interpretation here would require [a] more compelling demonstration of
significant progress towards a particular practical solution than seems presently required ...
[and] would be a major contribution to protecting the commons."); Teresa M. Summers, The
Scope of Utility in the Twenty-First Century: New Guidance for Gene-Related Patents, 91
GEO. L.J. 475 (2003) (arguing that the utility requirement should be used to restrict the num-
ber of patents granted for biotechnology invention and research tools); see also Michael S.
Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anti-
commons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 194-201 (2004)
(analyzing the development of the utility standard and the suggestions of commentators to
heighten the standard).
3. See, e.g., Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution to the Problem
Arising from Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 347 (2004); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Janice M. Mueller, The Eva-
nescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability:
Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917
(2004); Mueller, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., Ruth E. Freeburg, No Safe Harbor and No Experimental Use: Is it ime
for Compulsory Licensing of Biotech Tools?, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 351 (2005); Donna M. Gitter,
International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the
European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623 (2001).
5. As Mueller noted, an exclusion of certain technologies from patentability would
constitute an ultimate measure that has always been avoided in the U.S. and would run "afoul
of the developmental history of U.S. patent jurisprudence ...... Mueller, supra note 1, at 47.
Furthermore, even if U.S. tradition could be overcome, any exclusion from patentability would
have to conform to the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, especially to the non-
discrimination requirement of Article 27. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, art. 27.1, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 4988, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/Iegal-e/27-trips.pdf. An exclusion of research tools would
likely constitute a violation of TRIPS. Id. See also the analysis with regard to extending the
scope of the experimental use exemption to the use of research tools infra Part VII.C.2.b.
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highly unlikely,6 courts and patent offices recently seem to have followed
a more stringent application of the patentability requirements.7
The saga surrounding the Integra v. Merck cases has rekindled a
heated debate about the proper scope of both common law exemption
and the safe harbor provision, causing significant concern for owners of
research tool patents. This Article will argue that the next judicial deci-
sion addressing the question of research tool patents should clarify that
they are in a safe harbor because none of the two exemptions from in-
fringement referenced above extends to the use of research tools in
experiments in order to preserve the necessary incentives for their crea-
tion in the first place. Allowing access to research tools under any of the
exemptions-though arguably having a positive short term effect-
would endanger the development of sufficient innovative research tech-
nologies which may have a greater negative impact on the pace of
biotechnological research than an occasional lack of access to needed
resources.
This Article consists of nine sections. Section I will provide an in-
troduction to the most relevant theoretical justifications of the patent
system. Section II will give an overview of the development in the bio-
technology sector with its competing interests. Section III will define
research tools. Section IV will analyze the blocking effect of patents in
the biotechnology sector. Section V will argue for a broadened common
law experimental use exemption to alleviate some of the concerns among
6. The U.S. Patent Act never had a compulsory licensing provision. Barton reports that
there was substantial debate on compulsory licensing in the 1950s, but that it was violently
opposed at the time he wrote the article. John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking
in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 458 (1977). He
favors compulsory licensing provisions as they increase the leverage of sequential inventors to
obtain licenses for dependent improvements, thus heightening the incentive to conduct follow-
on research. id. at 453-55. See also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 839 n.2 (1990) (providing further refer-
ences). Compulsory licensing is generally viewed as contrary to the U.S. patent policy. See,
e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (describing compul-
sory licensing as "rarity" in U.S. patent system); Merges & Nelson, supra, at 911 (describing
compulsory licensing as an "anathema" and repeatedly rejected by the IP community). But cf
infra Part VII.B.4.b.
7. In response to criticism especially with regard to its application of the utility re-
quirement, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) raised the standard for utility when
it issued its new Utility Examination Guidelines in 2001. See 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-99 (Jan. 8,
2001). The Federal Circuit's decision in In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005), further
alleviated concerns when the court affirmed the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences'
rejection of a patent application directed to Expressed Sequence Tags (ESTs) without known
function as lacking specific and substantial utility. Furthermore, one decision designated pre-
cedential by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in 2007 indicates that, following
the Supreme Court's decision in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007), the
USPTO attempted to re-invigorate the non-obviousness requirement in the field of biotechnol-
ogy. Ex parte Kubin, 2007 WL 2070495 (B.P.A.I. May 31, 2007).
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academic researchers by exempting from infringements experimentation
on patented inventions. Section VI will provide an analysis of the yet
unclear scope of the safe harbor provision of § 271(e)(1) with respect to
research tools. Section VII will show why the use of research tools
should neither be exempted under the common law exemption nor the
safe harbor provision. Section VIII will address borderline cases where
the distinction between "research on" and "research with" a patented
research tool may arguably become blurred. Section IX will conclude
with an outlook.
I. THE RATIONALE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
The U.S. patent system derives its origin from the constitutional
grant of power to Congress "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries., 8 It is
strongly based on economic considerations and predominantly justified
with utilitarian principles. Several different theoretical approaches have
been used to evaluate how the patent system stimulates the technological
progress, such as, the incentive to invent, the incentive to disclose and
the incentive to invest.'0 European patent scholars additionally draw on
equity considerations embodied in the reward theories." Economic lit-
erature has discussed and critically analyzed each of the approaches,'2 so
that only a brief introduction to the incentive and reward based theories
will be given.'
3
8. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1024.
9. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW (2004), 1-50 (discuss-
ing the theoretical and philosophical origin of the patent system with numerous references);
FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 440
(1980); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1595-1615 (2003) (finding agreement among commentators that the basic purpose of the
patent system is utilitarian and discussing the different theories); Eisenberg, supra note 3, at
1024-28 (describing in detail the theories that patents encourage innovation); F. Scott Kieff,
Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REv. 697,
697-98 (2001) (finding that while rights-based or "natural law" approaches exert some influ-
ence on the theoretical debate, the predominant approach is utilitarian).
10. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 9, at 38-71; R. CARL MOY, MoY's WALKER ON
PATENTS §§ 1:26-42 (2003); Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1025-46. See, for example, Roberto
Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories about the Benefits and Costs of Patents,
32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031 (1998), for an economic analysis of the different theories.
1I. See RUDOLF KRASSER, PATENTRECHT [Patent Law] 34-35 (2004).
12. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1024-46; Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 10.
13. Other approaches shall be briefly mentioned but not be considered for the purpose
of this Article. The natural rights theories follow the teaching of Locke, arguing that the inven-
tor should own the invention as it is derived from his (mental) labor. See John Locke, The
Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 327-44 (Peter Laslett
Spring 20081
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A. Patents to Induce Inventions
The most familiar and most intuitive theory about the economic
function of patents is that they induce useful inventive activity.'4 The the-
ory rests on the assumption that certain inventions would not have been
made without the prospect of receiving exclusive rights which protect
their commercialization.'5 Absent patent protection, competitors could
easily appropriate inventions and may then have the competitive advan-
tage that they did not have to bear the costs of invention.'
6
B. Patents as Incentive to Invest
The "incentive to invest" theory focuses on a patent's function to in-
duce investment for the development and commercialization of
inventions.' 7 Under this theory, the patent system is not so much needed
to stimulate inventive activity; rather, it facilitates investment into costly
and risky development processes that are necessary to transform a
"mere" invention into a marketable product.' 8 This function is particu-
larly important in the biotechnology sector where a patent on a
promising compound or technology can attract capital for product devel-
opment.'9
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690). The Hegelian approach takes the view that, because
an invention is imbued with the personality and labor of its inventor, it belongs to him as a
natural right, like his freedom or personal space. See MARGARET J. RADIN, REINTERPRETING
PROPERTY 44-48 (1993); cf, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 27,
§ 2, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html ("Everyone has the right to the protection of the
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of
which he is the author."). Newer theories rely closely on economic analysis. See F. Scott Kieff,
Coordination, Property & Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompeti-
tive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327 (2006) (focusing on the coordination
function of intellectual property rights); Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property
Right, (Mar. 10, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=707202 (focusing on their function to allow
transactions of the protected subject matter and thus facilitating a more efficient allocation of
goods).
14. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 10, at 1032.
15. Id. at 1032; see also SCHERER, supra note 9, at 379-99; Eisenberg, supra note 3,
1024-25.
16. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1024-25.
17. See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 9; Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 10, at 1039-41. The
"incentive to commercialize" theories comprise Kitch's "Prospect Theory" which views the
patent as an important means to providing incentives for further investment to increase the
value of the patent; by allocating a broad right at an early stage, the patentee can coordinate
research and prevent wasteful duplication of resources. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276-77 (1977).
18. Kieff, supra note 9, at 708-12.
19. Investors are motivated by the prospect of filing continuation applications which
may also cover other indications (e.g., detection assay for further disorders). See Patent Law
Revision: Hearing on H.R. 2795 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Research Tool Patents
C. Patents as Reward for Inventive Activity
The reward theories consider it a principle of justice to reward the
inventor for his contribution to the economic and technological progress
resulting from his inventive activity.20 Conferring an exclusive right was
viewed as the simplest and most adequate way of rewarding the inventor
for his contribution because an inventor's profits will depend on the use-
fulness (i.e. commercial value) of his invention and be paid by the
21people benefiting from the invention-its users.
D. Patents as Incentive (Reward)for the Disclosure of Knowledge
The "incentive to disclose" argument rests on the premise that-but
for the patent system-inventors would not disclose their invention but
rather keep them a (trade) secret in order to prevent competitors from
exploiting them. The disclosure of an invention by virtue of the manda-
tory publication of the patent application increases the technical
knowledge available to the general public. 23 Furthermore, the disclosure
prevents wasteful duplication of research as third parties can build upon
the knowledge of the invention.24 The focus of the theory is not that pat-
ents are needed to stimulate invention, but to stimulate the disclosure of
knowledge and to facilitate its quick dissemination.25
Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 6 (2005) (statement of Robert Chess,
Executive Chairman, Nektar Therapeutics, testifying on behalf of the Biotechnology Industry
Organization), available at http://www.promotetheprogress.com/ptpfiles/patentreform/
houseoversight/091505/prepared/chess.pdf.
20. See, e.g., Friedrich-Karl Beier, Die herkommlichen Patentrechtstheorien und die
sozialistische Konzeption des Erfinderrechts [The Conventional Theories of Patent Law and
the Socialist Conception of Inventor's Rights], GRUR 1970, 1, 3-4.
21. Beier, supra note 20.
22. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1028-30 (with further references) (stating that
the theory is more popular with the courts than with commentators and questioning the eco-
nomic soundness of the theory with respect to inventions that could be exploited in secret
without the fear of competition). European commentators see the disclosure theory as related
to the reward theory; however, the general underlying policy of stimulating technological
progress remains the same for both reward and incentive theory. Cf., e.g., Rudiger Rogge, in
GEORG BENKARD, PATENTGESETZ, GEBRAUCHSMUSTERGESETZ [Patent Law, Utility Law]
(C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung 10th ed., 2006), Einleitung, marginal note 2; KRASSER,
supra note 11, at 35; Beier, supra note 20, at 4-5 (noting that knowledge contained in millions
of patent specifications would not have been made widely available but for the patent system).
But see Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102 YALE L.J.
777, 796 (1992) (pointing out that the incentive may only work where secrecy is not a viable
option because of the ease of reengineering the invention; otherwise the inventor would prefer
the possibility of perpetual protection through secrecy instead of a limited patent term).
23. Mireles, supra note 2, at 153-54.
24. Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of Com-
pulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 982 (1977).
25. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 10, at 1039. The disclosure theory-at least if
understood as part of the incentive approaches-loses its persuasiveness where an invention
Spring 20081]
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II. THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
Biotechnology has become one of the key technologies of the 21st
century and has already made an invaluable contribution to medicine,
agriculture, and industry in the past. 6 Some perceived it as the last sector
of America's technical superiority.2 Still in nascent stages in the 1980s,
the biotechnology sector has considerably grown in the last decades,
with an increase in market capitalization from $45 billion in 1994 up to
$410 billion in December 2005.28 The total number of patents granted for
biotechnological inventions has increased from 2160 patents in 1989 to
7763 patents in 2002.29 The share of patents granted to publicly traded
biotech companies has seen an even bigger increase from 393 in 1995 to
a peak of 1966 in 2002, before sharply declining back to 1434 by the end
of 2005.30 Additionally, the ownership structure has changed considera-
bly: while the majority of the biotech patents were held by a small
number of large companies in the 1995, ownership has atomized to in-
clude numerous small enterprises.3
The biotechnology industry is highly innovative and very research
intensive. Spending on research and development by commercial enter-
prises has increased to $19.8 billion in 2005, up from $7 billion in
1994.2 In view of the high costs of product development, the Biotech-
can be easily reverse-engineered; in such cases, trade secret protection does not constitute a
viable alternative to patent protection as the invention cannot be exploited without giving the
invention away. See Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (find-
ing it rare that an invention "cannot be deciphered more readily from its commercial
embodiment than from the printed patent."). But see Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the
Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 862 COWLES FOUND. DISCUSSION PAPERS
783, 794-95 (1987), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/cwl/cwldpp/862.html (finding em-
pirical evidence that trade secret protection is viewed as more effective than patents for many
process inventions).
26. See generally BRUCE ALBERTS, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL (Garland Sci-
ence 2002) (1989). For an overview of individual biotechnological achievements, see
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO BIOTECHNOLOGY 6-15 (2007), avail-
able at http://bio.org/speeches/pubs/er[BiotechGuide.pdf [hereinafter BIO, INDUSTRY GUIDE].
27. Tanuja V. Garde, Supporting Innovation in Targeted Treatments: Licenses of Right
to NIH-Funded Research Tools, I 1 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 249, 253 (2005).
28. BIO, INDUSTRY GUIDE, supra note 26, at 3.
29. Mireles, supra note 2, at 143 n.6.
30. See Saurabh Aggarwal et al., Insights into U.S. Public Biotech Sector Using Patent-
ing Trends, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 643, 643 (2006). The peak is likely to be the delayed
result of the investment bubble in 2000. Id. at 644. In 2002, approximately 50% of the patents
were granted to small biotech enterprises; however, whereas the number of patents granted to
big biotechnological companies remained roughly the same during the decline of patenting in
2002-2005, the numbers granted to small firms decreased by more than 40%. Id.
31. Id. at 650.
32. BIO, INDUSTRY GUIDE, supra note 26, at 3. According to PhRMA, the biopharma-
ceutical industry spent an estimated $55.2 billion on R&D in 2006, with $43.0 coming from
PhRMA member companies. See PHAMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF
Research Tool Patents
nology Industry Organization (BIO) views patents as "the needed assur-
ance for investors to risk the capital necessary in the long development
process," allowing not only recoupment of the investment but also the
generation of profits.
A. The Dynamics after 1980
In 1980, two events spurred the development of the U.S. biotech in-
dustry: the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision Diamond v.
Chakrabarty14 and the adoption of the Government Patent Policy Act of
1980, better known as the Bayh-Dole Act.35
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the court was faced with the question of
patenting "life" when it had to decide on whether a genetically engi-
neered organism for biologically controlling and decomposing oil spills
constituted patentable subject matter.16 The claims had been rejected as
being directed to a living organism, or, in the alternative, as being di-
rected to a product of nature." The Supreme Court reversed and
determined that the genetically modified organism was not a product of
nature and interpreted the statutory language of § 101, "manufacture"
and "composition of matter," broadly, so as to encompass genetically
modified organisms. The decision became famous for its sweeping
statement that statutory subject matter "include[s] anything under the
sun that is made by man" and has led to a significant increase of bio-
technological inventions.
The Bayh-Dole Act was promulgated to increase public access to
government funded inventions which were perceived as
AMERICA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2 (2007), available at http://www.phrma.org/
files/Profile%202007.pdf.
33. Biotechnology Indus. Org., Intellectual Property, http://bio.org/ip/ [hereinafter BIO,
IP] (last visited Feb. 10, 2008). BIO describes its mission as being "the champion of biotech-
nology and the advocate for its member organizations-both large and small." Biotechnology
Indus. Org., Mission Statement, http://bio.org/aboutbio/mission (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
34. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
35. Government Patent Policy Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2003).
36. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 307.
37. Initially, the claims were rejected as being directed to a living organism or, alterna-
tively, to a product of nature and thus unpatentable under § 101. The Board of Patent Appeals
reversed the product of nature rejection and upheld only the rejection of the claims as being
directed to a living organism, which in turn was reversed by the predecessor of the Court of
Appeal for the Federal Circuit, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. In re Bergy, 596
F.2d 952, 977 (C.C.P.A. 1979). The Commissioner of Patents and Trademark petitioned for
certiorari.
38. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 308.
39. Id. at 309. The decision evoked a spirited dissent by four Justices which considered
upholding a patent on a living organism as an expansion of the subject matter patentable under
§ 101 which should be left to Congress. Id. at 319-22 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Powell
JJ., dissenting). See also Garde, supra note 27, at 254.
Spring 20081
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under-commercialized. 0 It allowed universities to apply for patents for
inventions resulting from government funded research and to transfer
them to industry for development, including by means of exclusive li-
censing.4' Further, the legislation was enacted due to decreasing
investment in research and development and the fact that the U.S. indus-
41
try was falling behind in productivity compared to foreign competitors.
Subsequently, the role of university research changed profoundly as uni-
versities became more actively involved in "undertaking sophisticated
commercially-focused, high-risk research.' 43 Academic research has be-
come more closely linked to the commercialization of research results
through university transfer of technology offices, spin-offs, incubating
mechanisms, joint ventures with for-profit enterprises, or sponsored re-
search."
Since the inception of the Bayh-Dole Act, university patenting has
increased from less than 250 in 1980 to more than 3800 in 2004.4' Addi-
40. In the congressional hearings on the Bayh-Dole Act, Senator Stevenson pointed out
that less than five percent of government-owned patents had been commercialized in 1979.
See 126 CONG. REC. S I, 994-99 (Feb. 6, 1980) (statement of Sen. Stevenson).
41. Policies and Objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act include:
... to use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising
from federally supported research or development;
* to encourage maximum participation of small business firms in federally sup-
ported research and development efforts;
* to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organi-
zations, including universities;
* to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small business
firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise ...
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2005).
42. See Garde, supra note 27, at 254 & n.18 (referencing the relevant legislative his-
tory).
43. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM: REFORM WITH
A PURPOSE 5 (2002), available at http://www.atp.nist.gov/secy-rept/contents.htm [hereinafter
ATP REPORT]. See generally Ian M. Cockburn, 0 Brave New Industry, That Has Such Patents
in It! Reflections on the Economic Consequences of Patenting DNA, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 385 (F. Scott Kieffed., 2003).
44. See ATP REPORT, supra note 43, at 5-6. For more detailed view on the changes of
the role of universities, see MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVERSITY-
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (Yale Univ. Press 1986) and Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith,
Universities and the Market for Intellectual Property in the Life Sciences, 17 J. POL'Y ANALY-
SIS & MGMT. 253 (1998). With respect to the specific changes in biotechnology, see Peter
Shorett et al., The Changing Norms of the Life Sciences, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 123
(2003).
45. W. Mark Crowell, A Message From the President in ASS'N OF UNIV. TECH.
MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2004 (Ashley J. Stevens, Frances Tone-
guzzo & Dana Bostrom eds., 2005), available at http://www.autm.net/events/File/
04AUTMSurveySum-USpublic.pdf [hereinafter AUTM SURVEY]. Whereas universities held
only 1.1% of corporate owned patents issued between 1969 and 1986, the number has risen
threefold to 4.8 % in 1999, then falling to 4.18% in 2005. See U.S. Patent and Trademark
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tionally, more than 3100 new products resulting from university or non-
profit research have entered the market between 1998 and 2004. .
Whereas the Bayh-Dole Act has been successful in reaching its purpose
in increasing cooperation between university and industry and in increas-
ing the commercialization of inventions resulting from federally
supported research,47 the transition of the universities' role has not been
universally considered beneficial, and concerns about the long-term im-
plication of increased university patenting have been raised 48
B. Diverging Interests in the Industry
The biotechnology industry consists of a very heterogeneous mix-
ture of firms with often diverging, and sometimes opposing, interests.49 It
has become fashionable to refer to biotechnology firms as either belong-
ing to the group of "tool companies" or to the group of "product
companies." 0 Classic product companies like Amgen, Biogen, Chiron, or
Genentech have to overcome substantial risks to develop a compound
into a drug and perform the clinical studies required for its market ap-
proval. The development of a successful pharmaceutical drug costs
between $800 million and $1.2 billion and extends over a period of 12 to
15 years.5' If successful, the assumption of such risks is rewarded by
Office, U.S. Colleges and Universities-Utility Patent Grants 1969-2005 (2005)
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeipltaf/univ/asgn/table 1-2005.htm.
46. AUTM SURVEY, supra note 45.
47. See, e.g., Lita Nelsen, The Rise of Intellectual Property Protection in the American
University, 279 Sci. 1460, 1460 (1998) (considering the Bayh-Dole Act as "one of the most
successful pieces of economic development and job creation legislation").
48. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSHUA LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR
PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT
67 (2004) (considering the proximity of commercial development and basic academic research
in biotechnology as an important cause of potential conflicts between rights of "initial" inven-
tors and the process of cumulative accumulation); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights
and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987) (criticizing the
lack of distinction between fundamentals of basic (upstream) research and downstream devel-
opment and viewing the patenting of upstream research results as impairing the technological
and economic progress); Nelson, supra note 2, at 467-70 (considering the increased patenting
by universities as a result of the Bayh-Dole Act as a major part of the problem of blocking
access to scientific research results); see also Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290-91 (2003);
Michelle Cai, Madey v. Duke University: Shattering the Myth of Universities' Experimental
Use Defense, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 179 (2004).
49. Joseph Straus, Reach-Through Claims and Research Tools as Recent Issues of Pat-
ent Law, in ESTUDIOS SOBRE PROPRIEDAD INDUSTRIAL E INTELECTUAL Y DERECHO DE LA
COMPETENCIA, COLLECTION OF ARTICLES IN HONOUR TO ALBERTO BERCOVITZ RODRIGUEZ-
CANO 921 (2005). For a good overview of the biotech industry in the U.S. with short profiles
of some of the major players, see Aggarwal et al., supra note 30.
50. Cockbum, supra note 43, at 387.
51. The Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 1908 Before the Subcomm. On
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
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commensurate returns from the sale of the proprietary product. By con-
trast, tool companies like Celera, Quiagen, Human Genome Sciences, or
Millennium seek commercial return from the development of research
technologies and their sale to product developers." Naturally, both
groups have a different perception of the appropriate scope of research
tool patents. For drug development companies, research tools are neces-
sary inputs for their research, and consequently they are interested in
having access at the lowest possible cost; for the tool companies, how-
ever, research tools represent their lifeblood, and the patents protecting
them are often their only assets.53
The significant role of research tools can also be deduced from the
fact that research tool patents have been found to constitute the largest
component in the patent portfolios of biotech and pharmaceutical com-
panies, often amounting to more than 60% of the number of patents.
5 4
(2007) (testimony of Kevin Sharer, CEO and Chairman of the Board, Amgen, Inc.), available
at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Sharer070426.pdf. A new study estimates the costs
for the development of a successful biopharmaceutical also at $1.2 billion. Joseph A. DiMasi
& Henry G Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28
MANAGERIAL & DECISION EcON. 469, 469 (2007) (The average capitalized costs of $1241
million can be divided into $615 million for the preclinical period and $626 million for the
clinical period.). See also CHRISTOPHER ADAMS & VAN V. BRANTNER, SPENDING ON NEW
DRUG DEVELOPMENT (2005), available at http://ssm.comlpaper=869765 (estimating the aver-
age cost of bringing a new pharmaceutical drug to the market to over $1 billion); TuFTs CTR.
FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., OUTLOOK 2007 10 (2007) http://csdd.tufts.edu/infoservices/
outlookpdfs/outlook2007.pdf (estimating the average cost of a new biotechnology product at
$1.2 billion).
52. Straus, supra note 49, at 921. See also David Malakoff & Robert F. Service, Geno-
mania Meets the Bottom Line, 291 Sci. 1193 (2001) (providing a detailed overview of the
different categories of tool (and service) companies and the products (and services) they of-
fer).
53. PHILIP W. GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS, AND BIOTECH-
NOLOGY: FUNDAMENTALS OF GLOBAL LAW, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY 412 (4th ed. 2004);
Aggarwal et al., supra note 30 at 650. See also James H. Davis & Michele M. Wales, The
Effect of Intellectual Property on the Biotechnology Industry, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROP-
ERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 427-28 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (stating that
enterprises in the biotechnological industry exert their competitive advantage solely due to
intellectual property rights); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3 at 20 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l0/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT] (reporting
that panelists stressed the importance of patenting research tools for biotechnological compa-
nies. "[I]f there's anything you want to protect and incent with patents, it's the research tool
technology.").
54. Michael M. Hopkins et al., DNA Patenting: The End of an Era?, 25 NATURE BIO-
TECHNOLOGY 185, 186 (2007). Besides an analysis of patent application and grant data, the
surveyors interviewed representatives from 10 biotech firms, 10 pharma firms and 10 public
sector research entities which were among the top 50 most active assignees in the field and
collectively owned close to 30% of the patent families in the surveyed data set. See also Kevin
E. Noonan et al., Paradise Lost: The Uncertain Future of Research Tool Patents, 15 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 8 n.53 (2003) (reporting that "most biotechnology intellectual property
concerns reagents and methods for drug discovery and development").
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BIO describes intellectual property as the "key factor for economic
growth and advancement in the biotechnology sector" and patents as a
critical incentive for investment in the biotechnology industry." Venture
capital, a vital source of funding for the biotechnology industry, has in-
fluenced the industry significantly since the creation of the first
biotechnological start-up company (Genentech) in 1975.56 It still remains
an important source of funding for biotechnological startup companies.
7
Once venture capitalists target a suitable market for investment, they will
base their decision on a company's ability to defend their technological
market advantage through their patent rights 8 The patent position of a
company can have decisive influence on whether the company can con-
tinue on the market or whether it will disappear.59
Drug development companies often form research cooperations with
research tool companies, funding their research on specific compounds
in exchange for access to the discovered compounds.60 In the majority of
cases, the discovered compounds, such as proteins, cell-lines, or recep-
tors, will not become an active component of the final drug, but will
"merely" function as research tools, for example, for the identification or
isolation of suitable drug compounds or for the testing of their specific
biological properties. Consequently, licensing their use in research is
often the only way to extract economic return from the invention.
III. DEFINING BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH TOOLS
The rapid progress in biotechnological research has provided many
new insights into the functioning of the human body, the development of
diseases, their causation, and possible methods for their treatment. A
crucial means for gaining these insights and exploring the scientific rela-
tionship is the use of different types of research tools, whose availability
has created a revolution in biomedical research and has turned the
55. BIO, IP, supra note 33.
56. Terry C. Bradford, Evolving Symbiosis-Venture Capital and Biotechnology, 21
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 983, 983 (2003).
57. Id. at 984.
58. FTC REPORT, supra note 53, ch. 2 at I ("Biotechnology start-ups rely on their abil-
ity to patent their innovations to attract investment and continue innovating... ).
59. Id. ch. 3 at 18 ("The venture capital accessed through patents thus enables not-yet-
profitable companies to 'sustain ... innovation through massive investments in research and
development."); Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1039.
60. An example is the cooperation of Merck KGaA and The Scripps Research Institute
on the research on potential drug candidates that might inhibit angiogenesis which is the ob-
ject of patent infringement litigation and the Supreme Court decision Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences 1, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). See infra Part VI.A.I-4.
61. Esther Pfaff, "Bolar" Exemptions-A Threat to the Research Tool Industry in the
U.S. and the EU?, 38 IIC. 258, 260 (2007); Derzko, supra note 3, at 348.
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research process "from one of controlled serendipity to one of extremely
high probability of serendipity."62 Research tools have played a signifi-
cant role in promoting rapid technological development,63 as well as in
facilitating and accelerating the introduction of new diagnostic and
therapeutic products and methods.64
While there is no generally accepted definition of research tools,
65
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) proposes the following narrow
definition: "a technology that is used by pharmaceutical and biotechnol-
ogy companies to find, refine, or otherwise design and identify a
potential product of properties of a potential drug product. As such, it
serves as a springboard for follow-on innovation."'
Essentially, the FTC definition distinguishes research tools from
products with commercial application by the market they serve.67 Re-
search tools are sold generally to private and public scientists,68 whereas
the market for commercial applications consists of the general public.69
However, this distinction does not take into consideration that research
tools may also serve both markets and would seem to exclude research
tools that have an additional commercial application beyond their use in
a laboratory setting.70 Therefore, the broader, more inclusive definition
proposed by the National Institutes of Health will be adopted for the
purpose of this Article:
We use the term "research tool" in its broadest sense to embrace
the full range of resources that scientists use in the laboratory,
while recognizing that from other perspectives the same re-
sources may be viewed as "end products." For our purposes, the
62. Robert Blackburn, Research Tools in the Biotechnology Industry and the Hatch-
Waxman Act, Presentation at the 2001 High Technology Summit Conference University of
Washington, Seattle, in Symposium Series No. 7, July 2002, at 28, available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/CASRIP/SymposiumI/Number7/1 
-Blackburn.pdf.
63. See generally infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
64. Malakoff & Service, supra note 52; FTC REPORT, supra note 53, ch. 3 at 19 ("[A]
panelist suggested that research tools have led to a considerable reduction in the cost and time
required for the targeting of therapeutic antibodies during the initial stages of new drug re-
search.").
65. The very attempt to define a category of research tools has been criticized because it
is sometimes impossible to distinguish between "things that are used only in the laboratory
and things that might potentially be sold to non-research consumers." Derzko, supra note 3, at
352. As an example, Derzko names a DNA sequence that, at first, is thought to be useful only
for research purposes but ultimately turns out to be a diagnostic marker or to encode a thera-
peutic protein. Id.
66. FIC REPORT, supra note 53, ch. 3 at 18.
67. Id.
68. See Malakoff & Service, supra note 52.
69. See FTC REPORT, supra note 53 ch. 3 at 18.
70. Derzko, supra note 3, at 352. See also Mireles, supra note 2, at 149 (recognizing
the fact without drawing any consequences).
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term may thus include cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, re-
agents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry
libraries, drugs and drug targets, clones and cloning tools (such
as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and machines, data-
bases and computer software."
For purposes of this article, research tools that have no use but in re-
search (i.e. research tools according to the FTC definition) will be
referred to as "pure research tools" and research tools with a further
commercial application will be referred to as "dual purpose research
tools."72 Regardless of how the term "research tool" is defined, it should
be noted that the term is not neutral, but already reflects the perspective
of a consumer and not of the manufacturer.73 From the manufacturer's
perspective, research tools are end products, not merely intermediate
products necessary for production of an end product.
74
Examples of patented research tools include the following:
(1) Recombinant DNA techniques.7 ' The method and plasmids
for gene cloning developed by Cohen and Boyer were deemed the
founding technology for the biotechnology industry.7 6 The respective
patents were co-owned by Stanford University, University of California,
71. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
HEALTH (NIH) WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (June 4, 1998),
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm [hereinafter NIH, RESEARCH TOOLS]. The
Guidelines issued by NIH for recipients of NIH research grants use the terms "unique research
resource" and "biomedical research resource" instead of research tools. The terms "research
tools" and "materials" are used ... interchangeably with "unique research resources." Princi-
ples and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and
Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72.092 n.l
(Dec. 23, 1999). The notable difference from the definition of the NIH Research Tool Working
Group, however, is that this definition does not include drugs or drug targets.
72. Derzko starts with the same distinction, however she uses the term "partial research
tools" for dual purpose research tools. Derzko, supra note 3, at 353. However, dual use seems
more appropriate as the other term would imply that the compound is only partially suitable
for research, which is not the case.
73. Derzko, supra note 3, at 350. The different perspectives are already acknowledged
in the summary of the NIH Report: "One institution's research tool may be another institu-
tion's end product." See NIH, RESEARCH TOOLS, supra note 71. The report further showed that
private firms were concerned with the broad definition of "research tools" due the difficulty of
distinguishing between pure research tools and research tools considered to be a final product
potentially sold to the general public. Id.
74. Derzko, supra note 3, at 350; Davis & Wales, supra note 53, at 434.
75. U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224 (filed Jan. 4, 1979) (issued Dec. 2, 1980) (directed to the
method); U.S. Patent No. 4,468,464 (filed Nov. 9, 1978) (issued Aug. 28, 1984) (directed to
plasmids).
76. See Tim Beardsley, Big-Time Biology, Sci. AM., Nov. 1994, at 90. Cohen and Boyer
received the Lemelson-MIT Prize in 1996 and the Albany Medical Center Prize in Medicine in
2004 in recognition of this outstanding achievement.
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San Francisco, Cohen, and Boyer, and widely licensed on non-exclusive
and inexpensive terms."
(2) Polymerase chain reaction (PCR). PCR allows the selective and
exponential amplification of DNA or RNA sequences using Taq-
Polymerase. 7'8 The technology became a vital tool for researching and
analyzing genes in biological samples; without it, the sequencing of the
human genome would not have been possible. 79 The patents had been
assigned by Cetus to Hoffmann-LaRoche who tied respective licenses to
the purchase of other Hoffmann-LaRoche products. License terms di-
verged depending on the licensee and, since the terms were not nearly as
welcoming as licenses to the Cohen-Boyer patents, have been met with
criticism.8°
(3) Animal models, such as the Harvard Oncomouse." The mouse
was genetically modified to be susceptible to developing cancer and is a
useful tool in cancer research.
77. Merges & Nelson, supra note 6, at 906. For details and an analysis of the licensing
situation, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE
DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP
HELD AT THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, FEBRUARY 15-16, 1996 42-44 (1997), avail-
able at http:/Ibooks.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=5758&page=42 (use the forward button
above the text to navigate to the other pages) [hereinafter NAS WORKSHOP RESEARCH TOOLS]
and Irving N. Feit, Biotechnology Research and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 819, 820 (1989).
78. For details on the invention of PCR, see PAUL RABINOW, MAKING PCR (1996). The
inventor of Taq polymerase, Kary Mullis, shared the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1993 for the
revolutionary work. NAS WORKSHOP RESEARCH TOOLS, supra note 78, at 43.
79. NAS WORKSHOP RESEARCH TOOLS, supra note 78, at 43 ( "Tom Caskey, senior
vice-president for research at Merck Research Laboratories and past-president of the Human
Genome Organization, attributes much of the success of the Human Genome Project to PCR:
'The fact is that, if we did not have free access to PCR as a research tool, the genome project
really would be undoable ... Rather than bragging about being ahead, we would be apologiz-
ing about being behind.' ").
80. Some participants of the NAS Workshop "Research Tools" reported that the costs
for Taq-polymerase had made some research projects unfeasible. For small biotechnological
entrant companies, the use of the PCR technology was too expensive and prevented them from
developing further PCR research tools. NAS WORKSHOP RESEARCH TOOLS, supra note 78, at
44.
81. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984) (issued Apr. 12, 1988); European
Patent No. 0169672 (filed June 24, 1985) (issued May 13, 1992) (both directed to transgenic
non-human mammalian animals).
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(4) Expressed Sequence Tags (ESTs).82 Expressed Sequence Tags
(ESTs) are small pieces of cDNA with lengths of 200 to 500 bp.83 They
are primarily used for the discovery or identification of expressed genes,
for the identification of coding regions in genomic sequences, or as a
marker to locate a gene on a physical map of a genome.84 The patentabil-
ity of ESTs has been controversially debated 5 because the patent
applications often disclosed only a general utility, such as the "use as a
marker."8 6 However, the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Fisher
82. According to John Doll, Director at the USPTO, more than 2,300 patents for gene
sequences had been granted by the USPTO until May 2001. Henrik Holzapfel, Die paten-
trechtliche Zulissigkeit der Benutzung von Forschungswerkzeugen [The Admissibility of the
Use of Biotechnological Research tools under Patent Law], in GRUR INT. 2006, 10, 1I n.3
(2006) [hereinafter Holzapfel, Research Tools]. Incyte Pharmaceuticals alone is reported to
have filed more than 400,000 patent applications for gene sequences. Timothy A. Worrall, The
2001 PTO Utility Examination Guidelines and DNA Patents, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123,
127-28 (2001). For information on relevant patent statistics and applicants' strategies, see, for
example, ALEXANDER R. KREFFT, PATENTE AUF HUMAN-GENOMISCHE ERFINDUNGEN [Patents
on Human Genomic Inventions] 47-49 (2003); Martin Bobrow & Sandy Thomas, Patents in a
Genetic Age, 409 NATURE 763 (2001); Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual
Property Rights in Genes and Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Se-
quence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2000); Joseph Straus, Abhiingigkeit bei Patenten auf
genetische Information-ein Sonderfall? [Dependency of Patents on Genetic Information-A
Special Case?], GRUR 1998, 314; Worrall, supra.
83. They are produced either by reverse transcription of short mRNA sequences isolated
from a mix of mRNA representing expressed genes or from random parts of cDNA taken from
cDNA libraries. See Mark D. Adams et al., Complementary DNA Sequencing: Expressed Se-
quence Tags and Human Genome Project, 252 SCIENCE 1651, 1652 (1991). For more
information on cDNA, see generally, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Human Genome Project
Information, http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/home.shtml (last visited
Mar. 5, 2008); National Center for Biotechnology Information, A Science Primer-Just the
Facts: A Basic Introduction to the Science Underlying NCBI Resources, ESTs: Gene Discov-
ery Made Easier, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/est.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2008).
84. See Mark D. Adams, et al., supra note 83, at 1651; Human Genome Organization
(HUGO), Statement on the Patenting of DNA Sequences, HUGO EUROPE GENOME DIGEST,
Apr. 1995, at 6-9.
85. See, for example, the discussion spurred by the application submitted by Craig
Venter for the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which was later abandoned. It was directed
to numerous ESTs without known function and published January 7, 1991 as W09300353.
For details on the NIH application with detailed analysis of the different views within NIH
and internationally, see, JOSEPH STRAUS, GENPATENTE [Gene Patents] 43-45 (1997), Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Genes, Patents, and Product Development, 257 Sci. 903 (1992), Rainer Mou-
fang, Patentierung menschlicher Gene, Zellen und Korperteile? [Patenting of Human Genes,
Cells, and Body Parts?] GRUR INT. 1993, 439, 441-43. See also KEVIN DAVIES, CRACKING
THE GENOME 61-64 (2001).
86. Cf, e.g. Lopez-Beverage, supra note 2, at 73. The utility requirement is one of the
patentability requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and re-
quirements of this title." (emphasis added). Furthermore, § 112(l) provides: "The specification
shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
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invalidated such claims for lack of utility and enablement, and should
have alleviated at least part of these concerns."'
The classification from a user's perspective is less controversial for
biological discoveries, such as (partial) gene sequences, promoters,
ligands and receptors controlling pathological symptoms, and methods
for their identification or manufacture. Nevertheless, even this group of
compounds and methods, often referred to as "upstream discoveries,"88
may be the result of considerable research. Even if only their manufac-
turer viewed such upstream tools as final products, the public may also
start viewing such tools as end products where further research shows
that a research tool may ultimately be used for a diagnostic or therapeu-
tic purpose. 89 For example, a gene sequence originally used only for
research purposes may turn out to be useful as a diagnostic marker or for
gene therapy. These additional uses widely broaden the potential market
of such products, expanding it from the market for laboratories to the
often much more valuable market for consumer applications.90
IV. BLOCKING PATENTS
The problem of blocking patents in biomedical research was first
perceived in the context of the patenting of genes. Gene patenting devel-
oped mostly unnoticed and, initially, did not generate much public
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same... ." (emphasis added). See also Tanya Wei, Patenting Genomic Technology-2001
Utility Examination Guidelines: An Incomplete Remedy in Need of Prompt Reform, 44 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 307 (2003).
87. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In this case, the claims were
directed to ESTs isolated from the maize genome. The disclosed utilities included identifica-
tion of polymorphisms, use as a probe or use as source for a primer. Relying on Brenner v.
Manson, the Court determined that the patent application failed to meet the threshold of sub-
stantial and specific utility because no function of the underlying genes was known and thus
the ESTs had to be considered mere research intermediates for conducting further research on
the maize genome. Id. at 1370-75 (citing Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966)). The dis-
closed functions were deemed unspecific and without real world use because they would be
performed by any EST. Indeed, the applicant was unable to show that any of the ESTs had
actually been used to identify a single polymorphism or promoter, or that a polymorphism or
promoter so identified would have a substantial and specific use. Id. at 1373-74. Cf. Revised
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-99 (Jan. 8, 2001).
88. Derzko, supra note 3, at 351.
89. NIH, RESEARCH ToOLS, supra note 71, at 13.
90. That products may be marketed only to research laboratories does not imply a dif-
ferent appraisal per se, as they are serving the needs of a market in its own right. Numerous
biotechnological firms serve this market and are specialized in the production of such research
tools as Invitrogen, Incyte, Human Genome Science or Celera Genomics. See Straus, supra
note 49, at 922.
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• 92
controversy,9' unlike the patenting of the first living organisms, or the
expansion of patentable subject matter to software 93 and business meth-
ods.94 The issue reached the public conscience for the first time with the
beginning of the Human Genome Project. In 1991, Craig Venter, then
working at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), submitted an applica-
tion for a patent covering numerous ESTs with unknown functions."
Early on, patents were granted for genes coding for known and sought
after proteins, a practice that was not perceived as being very different
from drug patenting.96 However, when the first patent applications were
submitted for DNA sequences with unknown functions far removed from
a final pharmaceutical product, the perception changed considerably and
such applications were compared to the attempt to patent scientific in-
formation.97 It was feared that the patenting of important parts of
scientific knowledge-knowledge that would previously have been made
available to the general public without proprietary restrictions-would
lead to a privatization of the scientific commons which would adversely
influence the future progress of science and technological progress.98
91. Peter F Corless, Recombinant DNA Inventions after Fiers, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 503
(1994). A primary reason may have been that the patents for genes closely corresponded to
foreseeable commercial products such as the diagnostic test for specific genes or useful pro-
teins. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reaching Through the Genorne, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, 209-10 (F Scott Kieffed., 2003).
92. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980) (upholding a patent of oil eating
bacteria). It was, as the court noted, not the first patent containing claims to a living micro-
organism; however it was the first time the Supreme Court addressed the issue. Id. at 314 n.9.
For the patenting of the first animal, see Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1424 (B.P.A.I.
1987) (allowing a patent on a transgenic mouse).
93. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
94. State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d. 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
95. The application, which was later abandoned, was published on January 7, 1991 as
W09300353. For more details especially on the NIH application with detailed analysis of the
different view within NIH and internationally, see STRAUS, supra note 85, at 43-45,
Eisenberg, supra note 85, and Moufang, supra note 85, at 441-43. The Intellectual Property
Committee of the Human Genome Organization commented that ESTs should be understood
as research tools and that a patenting of short sequences of randomly isolated portions of
genes and transcripts encoding proteins of uncertain functions should not be allowed.
Furthermore, the committee expressed its opinion that "DNA molecules and their sequences,
be they full-length, genomic or cDNA, ESTs, SNPs or even whole genomes of pathogenic
organisms, if of unknown function or utility, as a matter of policy, in principle, should be
viewed as pre-competitive information." HUGO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMITTEE,
STATEMENT ON THE PATENTING OF DNA SEQUENCES, in PARTICULAR RESPONSE TO THE
EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY DIRECTIVE (2000), http://www.hugo-intemational.org/PDFs/
Statement%20on%2OPatenting%20of%2ODNA%20Sequences%202000.pdf (emphasis added).
96. Eisenberg, supra note 91, at 210-11.
97. Id.
98. Nelson, supra note 2, at 464-66. However, Nelson remains pessimistic in how far
patent law will be able to address the problem as lines between research outputs that provide
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The problem of access to research tools is perceived as more acute
and is better documented in biotechnology than in any other scientific
field.99 This may be partly due to the high intensity of research being un-
dertaken in the biotechnology industry, and partly due to the perceived
restrictions on the developments of new methods of treatment for com-
mon diseases. Commentators have voiced their concern that patent
owners of research tools restrict the necessary access to research tools
for fundamental and basic research by not licensing their proprietary
technology or by charging premium prices. ° Due to the scientific com-
plexity of biotechnology research, investigators need access to a higher
number of research tools than in other industries.' °2 The number of pro-
prietary rights needed to conduct research respectively for the
exploitation of a final product may render certain research projects fi-
nancially infeasible and thus lead to a situation Heller and Eisenberg
termed as the "tragedy of the anticommons."' '° They feared that "[a] pro-
liferation of intellectual property rights upstream may be stifling life-
saving innovations further downstream in the course of research and
product development."'' "
tools for advancing a technology and final processes or products per se will remain blurred. Id.
at 466.
99. Mueller contrasts the field of biotechnological research with the development of
software where no difficulties with the access to proprietary research tools have been docu-
mented. Mueller, supra note 1, at 11. This has not changed in the years after the publication of
her article-access to research tools is still discussed only as a problem in the area of bio-
medical research.
100. The biotechnological industry spent close to $20 billion on research in 2005. BIO,
INDUSTRY GUIDE, supra note 26, at 4.
101. See, e.g., Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 48, at 295-96.
102. Garde, supra note 27, at 251; Mueller, supra note 1, at 12 (referring to DNA chip
technology making use of up to 40,000 gene sequences which would need to be licensed). See
also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), GENETIC
INVENTIONS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES 7 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf ("Biotechnology is a fast-moving
field in which new products and services are developed from an increasingly complex and
cumulative set of underlying technologies."); NIH, RESEARCH TOOLS, supra note 71 ("Bio-
medical researchers increasingly chose to collaborate with entrepreneurial companies that
understood and valued basic science ....").
103. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 698 (1998). Heller coined the term
"Tragedy of the Anticommons" describing a situation of underuse of assets as a result of too
many owners having the right to exclude each other from the use of a scarce resource without
anyone having an affirmative right to use. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticom-
mons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, Ill HARV. L. REV. 621,660 (1998).
104. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 698. Heller and Eisenberg define "upstream"
as pre-market (research), as opposed to downstream, which they define as products for diag-
nostic or therapeutic treatment. Id. However, "downstream" and "upstream" is always a
relative term depending on the perspective of the user. Even the adjective "pre-market" can be
misleading because there is a market for the products of so called "upstream" research,
namely the market for research tools. In contrast, under the situation of a "Tragedy of the
Research Tool Patents
Early data seemed to confirm these fears. A survey conducted in
1998 by the NIH Working Group on Research Tools found researchers in
all areas of the biotechnology industry in agreement that "the stacking of
intellectual property obligations as successive tools are used in the
course of an extended research project has the potential to impede or
even preclude the development of new and better diagnostic and thera-
peutic products."'' 5 They further reported a widespread belief among
interviewed firms that restricted access to research tools impedes the
rapid advance of research and that the situation is constantly aggravat-
ing.'' Whereas the study conducted by Walsh and Cohen reported only
anecdotal evidence of an existence of anticommons, 0 7 and a study of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science found a slightly
higher but still small negative impact,'0 8 two further studies seem to
Commons" described by Hardin 30 years earlier, numerous people have the right to use a
common resource without anyone having the right to exclude the other from such use, which
leads to an overuse, and, eventually, to the depletion of a common good. Garret Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244 (1968).
105. NIH, RESEARCH TOOLS, supra note 71. Based on this report, Mueller described the
anticommons theory as "far from a merely academic construct." Mueller, supra note I, at 7.
106. NIH, RESEARCH TOOLS, supra note 71.
107. JOHN P. WALSH ET AL., FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES'
COMMITTEE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND PROTEIN-RELATED INVEN-
TIONS: PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS TO RESEARCH INPUTS IN BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH 37-40 (2005). The study reports that none of the researchers actually discontinued
a research project and only a small percentage changed their research approach or experienced
a delay of more than one month. It suggests that industry and academia have arrived at work-
ing solutions. Id. See also Timothy Caulfield, et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of
Human Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1092 (2006) (find-
ing that "the effects predicted by the anticommons problem are not borne out in the available
data" and that a statistically significant effect can be found only with respect to gene patents
covering diagnostic tests); Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a BiomedicalAnti-
commons?, REG., Summer 2004, at 54 (stating that Heller and Eisenberg "have overstated the
case against patent protection at both the theoretical and empirical levels."). But see Paul A.
David, The Economic Logic of "Open Science" and the Balance Between Private Property
Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A Printer 13-16 (Stanford
Inst. for Econ. Pol'y Res., SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 02-30, 2003), available at
http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/02-30.pdf. David criticizes the value of such studies (his
comments relate to the earlier Walsh/Cohen study of 2002, though) as it will be hard to prove
the absence of a "tragedy of anticommons" because the research is aimed at proving a coun-
terfactual issue. Rational researchers are not likely to report abandoned projects that they
would otherwise have undertaken had the law not changed. Id. at 16.
108. STEPHEN HANSEN, ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF PATENTING IN THE AAAS SCIENTIFIC
COMMUNITY 7 (2006), available at http://sippi.aaas.org/survey/AAAS-IP SurveyReport.pdf.
The study found that 35% of academic researchers in biotechnology had difficulties in procur-
ing the necessary licenses to relevant IP rights in a five-year period. The number was even
higher for industry respondents, 76% of which reported that their studies had been affected by
difficulties in obtaining patented technologies. Id. However, as only 30% of the academic
respondents and 53% of industry respondents attempted to procure a license, the percentages
drop to 11% (for academia) and 40% (for industry). Id. at 14, 21. Using the industry-
unspecific percentages categorizing the delay, only 6% of the projects were delayed (23
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support the finding of a statistically relevant blocking effect (Murray &
Stern and Sampat).'09 However, Sampat describes the negative effect on
subsequent research as being confined to gene sequences rather than
other genomic technologies which are described as easier to invent
around and thus are more likely to be licensed liberally." ° Furthermore,
the impact on the overall public welfare is not immediately clear because
the patent incentive may be necessary to induce a firm to invest in the
development of genomic technology even if it reduces scientific research
later down the road."' Additionally, where specific research projects are
blocked by patents, the impact on the overall welfare depends on which
alternative project the researcher pursues with the time and resources
available to him. In other words, it depends on the "productivity of the
'next best' scientific trajectory:"' 2
V. THE COMMON LAW EXEMPTION
This section begins with an analysis of U.S. law on the common law
experimental use exemption (A) and contrasts it with the European ap-
proach (B). Subsequently, it will be argued why the European approach
better reflects the rationale of the patent system (C).
respondents), 5% of the projects needed to be changed (20 respondents), and 2% of the pro-
jects had to be abandoned (10 respondents). Id. at 22.
109. Fiona Murray & Scott Stem, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the
Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis 5
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 11465, 2005), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 1465.pdf (finding a modest anticommons effect based on de-
cline of the citation rate after the patent grant between nine and seventeen percent); Bhaven N.
Sampat, Genomic Patenting by Academic Researchers: Bad for Science? (2004) (on file with
author) (surveying the impact of genomic patenting on academic research).
110. Sampat, supra note 109, at 26-28; see also E. Jonathan Soderstrom, President-Elect,
Ass'n of Univ. Tech. Managers, Statement Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on
"Stifling of Stimulating-The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic Testing," 2-3, 5
(Oct. 30, 2007) available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Soderstrom07l030.pdf (testi-
fying that only anecdotal evidence of an anticommons effect has been found and that gene
patents do not have a significant effect on academic research, also partly due to the nuanced
approach to patenting and licensing taken by universities, especially concerning research tools).
Ill. Sampat, supra note 110, at 29.
112. Id. (citing evidence which shows that there is an excess correlation of scientists'
research portfolios in that numerous scientists pursue the same research targets). The necessity
of pursuing a different research trajectory could also result in a positive effect on net welfare
as it may help to prevent a wasteful duplication of research effort on the same project. Id. at
n.18; Caulfield, et al., supra note 107, at 1093. This would correspond to Kitch's prospect
theory that patents help to avoid a wasteful duplication of resources in reserving the further
exploitation of the patented technology to the patentee. Cf Kitch, supra note 17, at 276-77.
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A. The Unfortunate, Yet Clear, State of Current Law
The common law experimental use exemption was first promulgated
in Whittemore v. Cutter"3 as a balance between a patent's exclusive right
to exclude and the rights of others to construe the patented invention.
Justice Story saw its applicability "merely for philosophical experiments,
or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to pro-
duce its desired effects."" 4 Subsequent decisions have interpreted this
defense to infringement narrowly and courts have been very cautious to
apply the exemption in cases where a commercial benefit was derived
from the use of the invention."1
5
In reversing the lower court in Roche v. Bolar, the Federal Circuit
narrowly interpreted the common law research exemption." 6 The district
court had determined that Bolar's use of the patented drug solely for un-
dertaking the regulatory steps required for marketing an equivalent drug
after the expiration of the patent was de minimis and experimental, and
thus did not infringe Roche's patent."7 The Federal Circuit emphasized
that Bolar's "intended 'experimental' use was solely for business reasons
and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philoso-
phical inquiry" and thus not exempted from patent infringement." The
court further held that even though public policy may warrant an excep-
tion in favor of generic drug producers, it was the role of Congress to
maximize public welfare through legislation." 9 In the following year,
Congress passed legislation that was under consideration at the time of
113. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600)
(opinion by Justice Story while serving on the circuit in Massachusetts). For history and de-
velopment of the experimental use exemption, see, for example, Ronald D. Hantman,
Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 617 (1985), Tanuja V. Garde, The Effect of Disparate Treatment of the Experimental
Use Exemption on the Balancing Act of 35 U.S.C. § 104, 35 IIC 241, 242-47 (2004) and
Mueller, supra note 1, at 17-41.
114. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
115. Cf Spray Refrigeration Co. v. Sea Spray Fishing, Inc., 322 F.2d 34, 35 (9th Cir.
1963) (testing patented system for refrigerating fish on vessel that engages in commercial
fishing operation constituted infringement); Radio Corp. of Am. v. Andrea, 90 F.2d 612, 615
(2d Cir. 1937) (infringing assembly of components to test marketability of the device is com-
mercial use not covered by experimental use exemption). But see Pitcairn v. United States, 547
F.2d 1106, 1125-26 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (rejecting the defense that the patented helicopters were
purchased only for testing and experimental purposes because "experiments of such nature are
intended uses of the infringing aircraft manufactured for the defendant and are in keeping with
the legitimate business of the using agency"); Pfizer, Inc. v. Int'l Rectifier Corp., 1982 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17411, 15 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 1982) (experimental use doctrine applicable only
when there is "no intended commercial use of the patented article, none whatsoever").
116. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
117. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 572 F. Supp. 255, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
118. Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
119. Id. at 865.
Spring 20081
390 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 14:367
the Federal Circuit's decision. This piece of legislation, commonly
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, provided for faster marketing ap-
proval for drugs that are bioequivalent to approved drugs and a patent
term extension equivalent to the time lost during mandatory regulatory
approval process, and effectively superseded Roche v. Bolar.2
However, the new legislation was not intended as a complete substi-
tute for the common law research exemption, but rather, only partly to
overrule Roche v. olar.' Consequently, the exemption continued its
(narrow) existence. In Embrex v. Service Engineering, the Federal Cir-
cuit followed its prior practice of not extending the experimental use
exemption to acts committed by an enterprise in furtherance of its com-
mercial activity. ' Uses do not benefit form the experimental use defense
when undertaken only in the "guise of scientific inquiry" but with "defi-
nite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes. '
120. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). The proposal of § 202 of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which became 35
U.S.C. § 271(e), was undoubtedly prompted by the decision in Roche. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670 n.3 (1990); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-
Waxman Act and its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 187,
190 (1999) ("The famous case of Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals was reversed
specifically in Section 291(e)(1) of title of the United States Code."). For the scope of
§ 271 (e), see infra Part VI.A.
121. The Federal Circuit continued to cite Roche v. Bolar as precedent for the narrow
interpretation of the common law experimental use exemption and deems it superseded on
other grounds only. See, e.g., Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) ("This court has construed both the experimental use and de minimis exceptions
very narrowly."). See also Roche, 733 F.2d at 863 (holding that courts should not "construe the
experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of 'sci-
entific inquiry,' when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial
purposes").
122. Cf. Mueller, supra note I, at 28-33 (however, addressing the state of law before
Madey v. Duke).
123. Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1349. Embrex's patent claimed methods for the inoculation of
birds against diseases by injecting vaccines in specified regions of the egg before hatching,
thus immunizing the birds while they were still in the egg. Service Engineering built a proto-
type of an in-ovo inoculation device and hired two scientists to design around the patented
technology by injecting vaccine into parts of the egg not mentioned in the claims of the patent;
however, their tests showed that the device predominantly injected into amnion/yolk-sac,
which is an area covered by the patent. When Service Engineering started marketing their
device, Embrex sued for infringement. The district court found that the chief commercial
purpose of the testing was to demonstrate to its customers the usefulness of the methods of its
own in-ovo inoculation device and thus rejected Service Engineering's arguments that the tests
were done for the purpose of scientific inquiry. The Federal Circuit affirmed and denied the
safe harbor of the experimental use exemption. Id.
124. Id. (quoting Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir.
1984)). The concurring opinion by Judge Rader was even more restrictive and views the ex-
perimental use exemption routed in the law of a de minimis excuse, and thus not applicable
where any commercial application is envisioned. Id. at 1352-53 (Rader, J., concurring) ("Of
course, even if the experimental use excuse retains some lingering vitality, the slightest com-
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In Madey v. Duke, the Federal Circuit again considerably narrowed
the common law experimental use exemption. 2 1 Professor Madey di-
rected the Free Electron Laser Laboratory at Duke University and held
two patents practiced in his lab. The University continued to operate the
patented laboratory equipment after Madey had left the University;
Madey sued, inter alia, for infringement of his two patents. The district
court qualified Duke's use of the invention as experimental use and de-
nied infringement.
26
Revisiting its prior case law, the Federal Circuit reversed and held
that its precedents do "not immunize any conduct that is in keeping with
the alleged infringer's legitimate business, regardless of commercial im-
plications."' '27 The non-profit status of the researching entity or the
purpose of a particular research project (non-commercial basic research)
is not sufficient to qualify for the safe harbor when the use is "in keeping
28with the alleged infringer's legitimate business interests." Even re-
search projects conducted by major research universities like Duke that
are non-commercial were deemed ineligible for the application of the
common law research exemption, as such research activities "unmis-
takably further the institution's legitimate business objectives, including
educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in these
projects" and serve, inter alia, to "increase the status of the institution
and lure attractive research grants, students and faculty.' 29 It was the first
decision of the Federal Circuit or its predecessor courts addressing a
non-profit institution's (in-)ability to rely on the experimental use ex-
emption. 30
mercial implication will render the 'philosophical inquiry/experimental use' doctrine inappli-
cable, as occurs in the court's resolution today.").
125. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
126. Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 431 (2001).
127. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
128. Id.
129. Id. In a note, the court referred to Duke University's Policy on Inventions, Patents
and Technology Transfer and pointed out that the university "is not shy in pursuing an aggres-
sive patent licensing program from which it derives a not insubstantial revenue stream,"
which-although not explicitly acknowledged-may have influenced the court's sweeping
dictum of "infringer's legitimate business interests." Id. at 1363 n.7. See also Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 Sci. 1018 (2003) (regretting that the court did not
elaborate on how far Duke's aggressive patent policy was a factor for the decision).
130. Cai, supra note 48, at 177-78. The only reported decision addressing the question is
Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 637 (D. Col. 1935). The District Court of Colo-
rado qualified the experimental use of the patented machines in the university's School of
Mines's laboratory as non-infringing and thus did not take it into account when calculating the
damages for contributory infringement by the supplier of replacement part for the machines.
Id. at 703.
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As neither the Federal Circuit'3 ' nor the Supreme Court' in Integra
v. Merck opined on the common law experimental use exemption, Madey
v. Duke-for the time being-states the current rule of the law, enunciat-
ing an extremely narrow scope of the common law exception. 31 Under
this interpretation, hardly any scenario is conceivable in which a com-
mercial enterprise or a university can engage in research that qualifies
under the exemption.' The decision has provoked critical comments
both within the legal community and from non-profit institutions voicing
their concern that a narrow interpretation of the common law research
exemption would hinder scientific progress, especially in the biomedical
131. The Federal Circuit's majority opinion deemed the common law experimental use
defense not raised on appeal and thus did not address it. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck
KGaA (Merck 1), 331 F.3d 860, 863 n.2 (2003). In her dissenting opinion, Judge Newman
considered the issue sufficiently raised and briefed and set forth how the common law experi-
mental use exception should be applied to this case, also stating her disagreement with "the
sweeping dictum" in Madey v. Duke. Id. at 874-77, 878 n.10, (Newman J., dissenting). How-
ever, writing for the majority on remand, she clarified that the common law research
exemption was not argued on appeal before the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court and thus
was not at issue. Integra Lifesciences Inc., Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck 11), 496 F.3d 1334,
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
132. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences Inc., Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). It was not
briefed by the parties and thus the court addressed only the scope of § 271 (e). The experimen-
tal use defense was only argued in an amicus brief. See Brief for Consumer Project on
Technology, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12-21, Merck, 545 U.S. 193 (No.
03-1237), 2005 WL 435894.
133. The scope of the exception is comparable to the prior scope of permissible experi-
mental use under § 6 German Patent Act 1968. The old German patent laws did not contain a
codified experimental use exception. However, the case law had exempted from the effects of
the patent experiments with a protected substance only to a very narrow extent, namely in
connection with experiments to determine the formation and characteristics of the substance
and whether it was sufficiently pure and stable. Additionally, any use had to be of a non-
commercial nature, a criterion only met if the invention was used solely for personal or do-
mestic purposes. See Klinische Versuche II (Clinical Trials II), R.P.C. 423, 438
(Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] 1998); Thomas Hieber, Die Zulassigkeit
von Versuchen an patentierten Erfindungen nach § 11 Nr 2 PatG 1981 [The Admissibility of
Experiments on Patented Inventions under § I I No. 2 German Patent Act 1981], GRUR 1996,
439, 440.
134. See, e.g., Cai, supra note 48, at 192 ("In Madey, the Federal Circuit has essentially
destroyed any practical meaning to the experimental use defense. The decision has also shat-
tered the long-held myth about research exemption."); Eisenberg, supra note 129, at 1028
("Although the Madey decision did not extinguish the experimental use defense entirely, it
eviscerated it to the point that it is essentially useless to research universities."); Garde, supra
note 113, at 246 ("This holding severely limited, to the point of near elimination, the common
law experimental use defense"); Mueller, supra note 3, at 918 (". . .for all practical purposes,
the doctrine has become a nullity."). See also the subsequent application of lower courts, for
example, Applera Corp. v. MJ Research, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 293, 297 (D. Conn. 2004). Cf
Suzanne T. Michel, The Experimental Use Exception to Infringement Applied to Federally
Funded Inventions, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 269 (1992) (reaching the same conclusion based on an
analysis of the pre-Madey jurisprudence).
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field.'35 Even though the empirical study conducted by Cohen and Walsh
two years after Madey v. Duke suggests that its impact on the way uni-
versities perform their research is rather negligible, 6 numerous legal and
economic scholars have advocated a broadened experimental use exemp-
tion.'37 Since it has been repeatedly suggested that the Federal Circuit
should look to the approach to experimental use in other jurisdictions,
the European approach will be analyzed in the following subsection.
38
B. The European Approach to Experimental Use
A discussion of the "European" approach to the experimental use
exemption should be prefaced by saying that there is no truly uniform
European approach to patent infringement as a matter of law. A patent
issued under the European Patent Convention (EPC) is not a uniform
European patent but merely a "bundle" of national patents issued in a
unified granting procedure. Article 64(3) of the EPC stipulates that an
infringement suit under an EPC patent must be brought in national court
under the patent law of the relevant member state.'3 9 By the same token,
experimental use-as a defense to infringement-is an issue of national
law. Thus, a plaintiff enforcing a patent in more than one member state
may need to bring multiple parallel law suits with potentially differing
outcomes, depending on the relevant member state's body of law govern-
ing infringement and the scope of the experimental use exemption.
40
135. See, e.g., Brief for Association of American Medical Colleges et al. as Amici Curiae
at 4-5, Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1007); Eisenberg, supra
note 129, at 1018 (calling the decision unsurprising for legal community but "an alarming
wake-up call to the academic community"); Mueller, supra note 3, at 940 (viewing the deci-
sion as excessively restricting experimental use exemption for basic research).
136. John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 Sci.
2002, 2002 (2005) (finding that only two percent of university researchers "have begun check-
ing for patents in the 2 years since Madey v. Duke,' and only five percent have been made
aware of existing IP rights by notification letters, up from three percent before Madey v.
Duke). Cf. Cai, supra note 48, at 191 (concluding that the decision is not likely to have a great
impact on university research in view of rational forbearance of the patent owners).
137. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 3, at 919 n.8 (providing a detailed overview of the
scholarship). Mueller considers an experimental use exemption as the international norm. Id.
at 969. See also Garde, supra note 113, at 254-60; Nelson, supra note 2, at 466.
138. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 3, at 969. See also Integra Lifesciences Inc., Ltd. v.
Merck KGaA (Merck 11), 496 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader J., dissenting-in-part
and concurring-in-part) (suggesting a look at the German distinction in the context of inter-
preting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
139. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199,
274, available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/epc.html (click "PDF version"
link in the download box for the full text). Article 64(3) EPC provides: "Any infringement of a
European patent shall be dealt with by national law."
140. The classical case study is the famous "Epilady-saga," a multi-jurisdictional in-
fringement litigation between Improver and Remington, where different national courts
applied Article 69 EPC to determine whether the same device infringed the same patent and
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Having said this, there is some uniformity among the approaches the
member states have chosen. Most European countries have codified one
or more different types of experimental use exemptions. For example,
certain provisions exempt from liability scientific experimentation on a
patented invention, which will be referred to as the "experimental use
exemption" Others resemble a Bolar-style exemption, exempting from
liability experiments required for drug approval purposes, which will be
referred to as the "clinical trials exception."'4'
1. The Experimental Use Exemption
Article 31(b) of the Community Patent Convention (CPC) 1975 ex-
empts from liability for infringement "acts done for experimental
purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention."'42 Even
though the CPC has never entered into force 43 and thus has no binding
legal effect, most, if not all member states have codified a similar provi-
sion in their national patent laws.' For example, § 11 No. 2 German
came to differing results. See Improver Corp. v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., R.PC 69
[U.K. Court of Appeal] (1989) (finding infringement in interlocutory proceedings and granting
an injunction) and F.S.R 181 [U.K. Patents Court] (finding non-infringement); Dusseldorf
Court of Appeals [OLG Diisseldorf], 24 IIC 838 (1993) (F.R.G.) (finding infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents); Gerechtshof [Court of Appeal], 24 IIC 832 (1993) (Neth.) (find-
ing infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Oberlandesgericht Wien [Vienna Court of
Appeals], 23 IIC 391 (1992) (Austria) (rejecting the grant of an injunction in interlocutory
proceedings); Tribunale di Milano, GRUR INT. 1993, 249 (determining in interlocutory pro-
ceedings that the defendant's device constituted a dependent invention and finding direct
infringement).
141. Cf, e.g., Patentgesetz [PatG] [German Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980 § 11(2) (experi-
mental use exemption) and § 11(3) (clinical trials exemption). Most laws contain a further
provision exempting "acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes." Id. at § 11(1).
142. Convention for the European Patent for the common market signed at Luxembourg
on December 15, 1975, is commonly referred to as the Community Patent Convention (CPC
1975). An identical provision is contained in Article 27(b) CPC 1989. The provision has been
codified without any reference to existing national provisions and has to be interpreted
autonomously. Cf PETER CHROCZIEL, DIE BENUTZUNG PATENTIERTER ERFINDUNGEN ZU
VERSUCHS- UND FORSCHUNGSZWECKEN [The Use of Patented Inventions for Experimental and
Research Purposes] 163, 166 (1986) [hereinafter CHROCZIEL, USE OF INVENTIONS]; Hieber,
supra note 133, at 443.
143. Both approaches have failed due to unresolved translation issues and disputes about
the constitution of courts responsible for patent infringement suits. See Albrecht Krieger et al.,
Die dritte Luxemburger Konferenz iiber Gemeinschaftspatent vom 11. bis 15. Dezember
1989-Bericht der deutschen Delegation, [Third Luxemburg Conference on the Community
Patent, December II to 15, 1989-Report of the German Delegation] GRUR INT. 1990, 173.
A new attempt to create a uniform Community Patent was initiated by the European Union in
2000. Article 9(b) of the proposed regulation contains an identical provision. Cf Council Pro-
posal for a Regulation on the Community Patent, COM 412 final, OFFICIAL J. EUR.
COMMUNITIES C 337, 278, 280 (2000).
144. William Cornish, Experimental Use of Patented Inventions in European Community
States, 29 IIC 735, 736 (1998) (with reference to the similar or identical national provisions in
note 2 and diverging Dutch and Portuguese provisions in note 3).
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Patent Act (GPA) uses identical language and provides: "The effects of a
patent shall not extend to ... acts done for experimental purposes relat-
ing to the subject matter of the patented invention." '' 45
The provenance of the German and other national exemption provi-
sions from Article 31(b) of the CPC is important as European courts
favor adopting a common approach to the interpretation of national pro-
visions that are derived from a common European source like the CPC
(or the EPC).'4 6 Article 3 1(b) of the CPC and the corresponding provi-
sions in the European patent laws exempt from infringement actions
under two cumulative requirements: (1) the actions have to be experi-
ments, and (2) they must relate to the patented subject matter.'4 7 Whereas
an experiment is broadly defined as a procedure for obtaining informa-
tion, such as presupposing existing uncertainties, the requirement that
the experiment must relate to the patented subject matter of the invention
considerably limits the exception. 48
The German Federal Court of Justice held in its first Clinical Trials
decision that § 11 No. 2 GPA "in principle exempts all experimental acts
as long as they serve to gain information and thus to carry out scientific
research into the subject-matter of the invention, including its use.
The disclosure requirement under patent law warrants that third parties
can test the invention during the patent term and, based on the informa-
145. Patentgesetz [PatG] [German Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980 § 11 (2).
146. Cornish, supra note 144, at 737. See also Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co. et al.,
[19851 R.P.C. 515, 536 (Ct. App.) (U.K.) (referring to § 130(7) U.K. Patent Act, which pro-
vides for giving corresponding provisions "as nearly as practical, the same effect in the United
Kingdom as the corresponding provisions of ... the Community Patent Convention");
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], July 11, 1995-Clinical Trials !, 28 IIC
838 (1997); [1997] R.P.C. 623, 640 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Clinical Trials I] (principles of inter-
pretation derived from national law cannot be directly applied to provisions which have been
adapted to uniform European Law). Cf Peter Ruess, Accepting Exceptions?: A Comparative
Approach to Experimental Use in U.S. and German Patent Law, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REv. 81, 95-101 (2006) (analyzing the case-law before and after the adoption of § I I No. 2
GPA).
147. Cf Clinical Trials , supra note 147, at 638; Cornish, supra note 144, at 736.
148. Clinical Trials 1, supra note 147, at 638 (requiring a "finality between the act for a
particular experimental purpose and the subject-matter of the invention").
149. Id. at 639. See also, Clinical Trials H, supra note 134, at 438 (stating that an activity
is more likely to fall in the experimental use exemption when it is "is oriented towards clear-
ing up uncertainties with regard to the object of the patented invention or bringing out new
discoveries about said object, provided these activities with research purposes relate to the
object of the patented invention."). The extension of the exception from experiments merely
on the subject matter of the invention to inquiries into its possible uses has been generally
adopted in European legal scholarship. See Alfred Keukenschrijver, in PATENTGESETZ [Patent
Act] (Rudolf Busse ed., 2003) § I I marginal note 17; Kiuhnen, in PATENTGESETZ MIT Eu-
ROPAISCHEM PATENTUBEREINKOMMEN [Patent Act and European Patent Convention], (Rainer
Schulte ed., 2005) § I I marginal note 12. See also Wolfgang von Meibom & Johann Pitz,
Experimental Use and Compulsory License Under German Patent Law, PAT. WORLD, June-
July 1997 at 27, 27 (1997).
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tion obtained through the permissible trials, further develop the technol-
ogy.'50 Additionally, the court clarified that ultimate commercial purpose
is irrelevant, when it stated: "[I]t cannot matter whether the experiments
are used only to check the statements made in the patent or else to obtain
further research results and whether they are employed for wider pur-
poses, such as commercial interests."'5 ' Since the ultimate commercial or
non-commercial purpose is irrelevant, research performed by universities
or non-profit institutions is subject to the same standards and does not
enjoy a broader privilege than research focused on commercial applica-
tions. 52 Nevertheless, the courts have clarified that experiments can no
longer benefit from the experimental use exemption if they exceed a cer-
tain scale.'53
2. Application to Research Tools
Although no court decision explicitly addressed exempted uses of
patented research tools, the rationale underlying those cases establishes a
clear line of demarcation. Under § 11 No. 2 GPA, experiments on re-
search tools are exempted from infringement.5 4  Therefore, any
experiment directed at obtaining new information on a patented research
150. See Clinical Trials I, supra note 147, at 639; German Federal Court of Justice, June
2, 1984-Erythronolid, GRUR, 1985 734. See also von Meibom & Pitz, supra note 149, at 28.
151. Clinical Trials 1, supra note 147, at 639. See also Clinical Trials II, supra note 134,
at 431 (the mere fact that the results obtained by the experiments are not solely used for re-
search purposes but "above all" serve commercial purposes as well does not render an
experiment infringing); Monsanto v. Stauffer [1985] R.P.C. 515, 538 (rejecting a "hard and
fast" line that would render experiments that are ultimately directed to commercial exploita-
tion infringing and allowing limited experiments to determine whether a quality product could
be manufactured commercially according to the specification of the patent). Cf von Meibom
& Pitz, supra note 149, at 30.
152. HENRIK HOLZAPFEL, DAS VERSUCHSPRIVILEG IM PATENTRECHT UND DER SCHUTZ
BIOTECHNOLOGISCHER FORSCHUNGSWERKZEUGE [Patent Law's Experimental Use Privilege
and the Protection of Biotechnological Research Tools] 205-07 (2004) [hereinafter HOL-
ZAPFEL, EXPERIMENTAL USE]; Krasser, supra note I1, at 813-15.; Kiihnen, supra note 149;
Scharen, in PATENTGESETZ, GEBRAUCHSMUSTERGESETZ, supra note 22, § II marginal note 7;
Wolfgang von Meibom & Johann Pitz, Klinische Versuche-eine transatlantische Betrachtung
vor dem Hintergrund der Entscheidung des BGH "Klinische Versuche I1" [Clinical Trials-A
Transatlantic Review in Regard to the Federal Court of Justice's decision "Clinical Trials 11"]
[hereinafter Meibom & Pitz, Clinical Trials], MITT. 1998, 244, 249.
153. Monsanto v. Stauffer, [1985] R.P.C. 515, 543 (exemption did not extend to series of
field experiments where potential customers could observe the results); Applied Research Sys.
Holding N.V. v. Organon et al., Gerechtshof [Hof] [Court of Appeals], 3 Feb. 1994, NJ 463
(Neth.), 28 IIC 558 (1997) (clinical trials and testing of a generic version of a human follicle-
stimulating hormone at hospitals, laboratories and research stations in ten European states too
extensive to qualify as experimental use).
154. See, e.g., Henrik Holzapfel, Die patentrechtliche Zulassigkeit der Benutzung von
Forschungswerkzeugen [The Admissibility of the Use of Biotechnological Research tools
under Patent Law], in GRUR INT. 2006, 10, 13 (2006) [hereinafter Holzapfel, Research
Tools].
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tool is exempted from liability, for example, to determine its suitability
to be used for a new purpose or to find out properties of modifications.
Under the European approach, the experiments conducted by Scribbs
and Merck would have been exempted from infringing the product
claims for the RGD-peptide even if, arguendo, the RGD-peptides were
research tools because the experiments were directed at obtaining infor-
mation about the peptide and its potential uses.'55 Furthermore, as § 11
No. 2 GPA also exempts clinical trials required for the approval of new
indications, 1 6 the trials conducted by Merck would also have been ex-
empted as they were directed at collecting data necessary for obtaining
market approval for a new (the first) indication.
However, as the German Federal Court of Justice explicitly stated in
Clinical Trials I, the experimental use exemption does not extend to uses
"which make the invention the means for experimental acts."'57 Conse-
quently, the use of a biotechnology research tool according to its
patented purpose, for example to identify useful compounds or their
properties, does not fall under the experimental use exemption.' The
prohibition applies equally to their use in basic research performed by
universities and non-commercial enterprises. '59
Although German appellate courts have yet to decide a case on ex-
perimental use involving the use of a research tool, the principles set
forth in the Clinical Trials decisions are clear and have been applied
155. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck 1), 331 F.3d 860, 862
(2003). See facts infra Part VI.A. I.
156. Clinical Trials 1, supra note 147, at 628 (experimentation to find new uses for a
patented invention are experiments on patented subject matter). See also Kirin Amgen v. Boe-
hringer Mannheim, Gerechtshof [Hof] [Court of Appeals], 3 Feb. 1994, NJ 462 (Neth.)
(experiments on erythropoietin to find new medical indications permissible even when product
is already marketed for other indication). Cf Cornish, supra note 144, at 753 (expecting the
other European countries to follow the approach of the German Federal Court of Justice in the
Clinical Trials decisions.) In its later decision, the court extended the experimental use exemp-
tion to clinical trials on the patented compound even if they were not conducted for approval
of a new indication as long as the experiments are directed to eliminating "an existing insecu-
rity." The defendant had conducted clinical trials to determine in which form his human
erythropoietin drug is best administered; the court held that it made no difference whether the
indication of the agent's composition is already well known. See Clinical Trials H, supra note
134, at 433-36. See also Keukenschrijver, supra note 149, § I I marginal note 18.
157. Clinical Trials I, supra note 147, at 641-42 (emphasis added).
158. Cf Peter Chrocziel, Benutzung zu Versuchszwecken als Einwand gegenuber einem
Anspruch wegen Patentverletzung (Q 105) [Use for Experimental Purposes as Defense Against
a Claim of Infringement (QI05)], GRUR INT. 1992, 203, 205 [hereinafter Chrocziel,
Experimental Use]; Joseph Straus, Zur Zul'ssigkeit klinischer Untersuchungen am
Gegenstand abhangiger Verbesserungserfindungen [The Admissibility of Clinical Trials on
Dependent Improvement Inventions], GRUR INT. 1993, 308, 311; von Meibom & Pitz,
Clinical Trials, supra note 152, at 247.
159. Chrocziel, Experimental Use, supra note 158, at 205; CHROCZIEL, USE OF INVEN-
TIONS, supra note 142, passim; Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 13; Scharen,
supra note 22, § I I marginal note 7.
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accordingly by a trial court in 2003 when it was faced with such a situa-
tion.' 60 In the German part of the infringement proceedings between
Bayer and Housey with respect to the use of their patented screening
process, the District Court Dusseldorf rejected Bayer's argument that
their use of the invention was exempted under § 11 No. 2 GPA.16' Having
determined that the patented screening process had been practiced ac-
cording to its technical teaching, the court had to address the defense of
experimental use.162 The defendant argued that it used the process to de-
termine whether certain compounds can be used for activating or
inhibiting soluble Guanylatcyclase (sGC) and that the experiments were
solely directed at establishing a cell line; however, the court determined
that the experiments had the (additional) purpose of analyzing the char-
acteristics of certain activators of sGC which were known only from
cell-free systems.' 63 The court rather summarily rejected Bayer's argu-
ments and found infringement as Bayer had not restricted itself to create
a cell-line but had used the patented method as a means of their screen-
654ing process, thus in accordance with the patented purpose.'
C. Why the European Approach Better Reflects the
Rationale of the Patent System
Admittedly, the distinction between "experimentation on a patented
invention" and "experimentation using a patented invention" does not
have any judicial precedent in U.S. patent law.6 Nevertheless, the dis-
tinction has been widely accepted by commentators as an important, if
160. Landgericht Dusseldorf [LG] [District Court Dusseldorf], Oct. 28, 2003, 4a 0
362/02, available at http://cip.bravo771.server4you.de/www/ddorf entsch/?q=node/395.
161. Id. The screening process involved several steps: First, a modified cell line is cre-
ated, which expresses the protein of interest and exhibits a phenotypic response to the protein.
The modified cell line has a lower level of expression and a lesser degree of phenotypic re-
sponse compared to the original cell line. Agents are applied to both cell lines; based on a
comparison of their phenotypic responses it can be determined whether the agent is an inhibi-
tor or activator of the protein. For details on the invention and on the parallel proceedings in
the U.S., see Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
162. District Court Diisseldorf, 4a 0 362/02, at II.
163. Id.
164. Id. (the decision was appealed)
165. But see the failed attempt to codify an experimental use exemption which used the
distinction, H.R. REP. No. 100-888 at 51 (1988). Furthermore, in both Integra v. Merck deci-
sions of the Federal Circuit, the dissenting judges voiced the appropriateness of such
differentiation. See Merck I, 331 F.3d 860, 873, 877-878 (Newman, J., dissenting) (distin-
guishing in her discussion of the common law exemption between research into the science
and technology disclosed in patents, and the use in research of patented products or methods,
the so-called "research tools": "Use of an existing tool in one's research is quite different from
study of the tool itself."); Merck H, 496 F.3d 1334, 1351 (Rader, J., dissenting-in-part and
concurring-in-part) (referring for guidance to opinions of foreign courts distinguishing be-
tween research on and use in research).
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not decisive, factor for the determination of whether an experiment
should be allowed to benefit from the common law research exemption
or not. '66 Distinguishing between research on and research with a pat-
ented invention corresponds to the rationale of the patent system that
inventive activity should be stimulated by granting exclusive rights with-
out simultaneously imposing undue restrictions on the technological
development. 67 Innovation is a cumulative process with innovators build-
ing on existing knowledge, colorfully described with the metaphor of
"standing on the shoulders of giants.",168 Exempting research on a pat-
ented invention facilitates this cumulative process as it provides for an
effective use of the information disseminated through the publication of
patent specifications, and thus aids the creation of new technical knowl-
edge. 69 The dissemination of knowledge is an important function of the
patent system' 70 and would be impaired until after the patent term if no
experiments on the patented invention would be allowed. '
166. Mueller, supra note 3, at 957-58. See also Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1078 (sug-
gesting that the experimental use exemption should allow experiments directed to testing
whether the patent specification sufficiently discloses the patented invention, but not extend-
ing to circumstances where the researcher uses the invention like an ordinary consumer). See
NIH, RESEARCH ToOLS, supra note 71, stating:
Foreign patent systems that recognize a research exemption typically distinguish be-
tween experimenting on a patented invention-i.e. using a patented invention to study the
underlying technology or perhaps to invent around the patent, which is what the exemption
covers-and experimenting with a patented invention to study something else, which the ex-
emption does not cover. So construed, the exemption would not be available for researchers
who make use of patented research tools in the course of investigating something else, as
opposed to those who are studying the research tools themselves. This is a sensible distinction.
It is difficult to imagine how a broader research exemption could be formulated without effec-
tively eviscerating the value of patents on research tools. Researchers are ordinary consumers
of patented research tools, and if these consumers were exempt from infringement liability, the
patent holder would have nowhere else to turn to collect patent royalties. An excessively broad
research exemption could eliminate incentives for private firms to develop and disseminate
new research tools, which could on balance do more harm than good to the research enter-
prise.
167. Clinical Trials I, supra note 147, at 642; Merck 1, 331 F.3d at 875 (Newman, J.,
dissenting) ("Today's accelerated technological advance is based in large part on knowledge
of the details of patented inventions and how they are made and used. Prohibition of research
into such knowledge cannot be squared with the framework of the patent law."). See also
Krasser, supra note 11, at 812.
168. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and
the Patent Law, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 29, 29 (1991) (citing Sir Isaac Newton's acknowledgement
"If I have seen far, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.").
169. Clinical Trials 1, supra note 147, at 642.
170. Cf supra Part I.D.
171. See, e.g., Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck 1), 331 F.3d 860, 873
(2003) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the patent system is ... to add to the body
of published scientific/technologic knowledge.... The right to conduct research to achieve
such knowledge need not, and should not, await expiration of the patent."). See also Clinical
Trials I, supra note 147, at 642 ("unlimited protection by the patent is unjustified where fur-
ther technical development is impeded").
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Furthermore, the possibility to experiment on the patented subject
matter allows third parties to assess the validity of the patented invention
and will help to weed out invalid patents.' Consequently, it would serve
as an additional corrective element and increase the quality of the patent
system.
There are other arguments that suggest that experiments on the pat-
ented subject matter should be allowed. The legislature contemplated the
patenting of improvements, 73 which typically involves and requires
studying and experimenting on the patented invention. 74 Unless third
parties are allowed to experiment on patented subject matter, the patent-
ees will have near-exclusivity for developing improvements and can
shield inventions from competition beyond reasonable measure.1
75
Negative effects for the patentee as a result of an experimental use
exemption are limited. In general, the patentee will benefit from new
insights relating to his invention, whereas the commercial value of the
invention is only affected to a very limited extent by the experiments.
When a third party applies for a patent on an improvement or a new in-
dication as a result of the information obtained by the exempted
experiments, he will have to obtain a license for the original patent,
therefore increasing its value.' 76 However, experiments on the patented
invention should be permitted even if they are directed at obtaining in-
formation that facilitates designing around the patent and could
172. Merck 1, 331 F.3d at 875 (Newman, J., dissenting); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprie-
tary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 219-22
(1987); Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 12. See also Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F.
Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) (allowing the construction of a machine
"for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described ef-
fects").
173. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (including "new and useful improvement" of the listed
categories as potentially patentable subject matter).
174. Mueller, supra note 3, at 976.
175. See Merck I, 331 F.3d at 875 (Newman, J., dissenting). But see MARTIN J. ADEL-
MAN, PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 3.6[2] at 3-78.2(59) (2d ed. 2006), who describes the
possible situation where the owner of a patent on a species, which has been discovered using
the patented technology of the dominating (genus) patent, waits for the expiry of the patent
before commencing with the exploitation. Arguably, this would deprive the owner of the
dominant genus patent of his share in the benefits of the species patent, as was the case in
Merck I. Id. However, under the assumption of rational economic behavior, neither party
would renounce the potential profits obtainable by exploiting the species invention under the
term of both genus and species patent, and a license agreement would be concluded. There
will be presumably only very few genus-species cases in which strategic considerations will
override rational economic behavior (Adelman points to Merck v. Integra as one example). Id.
However, the negative effects of these few cases will be outweighed by the stimulation of
research activities resulting from a broadened exemption, as they are likely to arise only where
potential profits are small, for example, due to the approaching expiry of the genus patent's
term.
176. Clinical Trials 1, supra note 147, at 644; Merck 1, 331 F.3d at 875 (Newman, J.,
dissenting). See also Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 12.
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ultimately diminish the value of the patent. That products and proc-
esses may become obsolete over time and will be replaced by new
innovative technologies reflects the very nature of the technological pro-
gress the patent system is meant to stimulate.
The proposed distinction has also been adopted in a resolution of the
International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property
(AIPPI), determining that:
Experimental use includes any use of the patented invention to
an extent appropriate to experimentation (as opposed to com-
mercial use) which is for the purpose of improving the invention
or making an advance over the invention or finding an alterna-
tive to the invention, but not the commercial exploitation of the
subject of any improvement or advance. 78
Finally, the patentee should not be deprived of the experimental use
exemption merely because the experiments on the patented invention
were ultimately motivated by further commercial interests.,7 9 In Madey,
the Federal Circuit pointed out correctly that even academic research can
also be viewed as motivated by monetary incentives. However, as the
fair use exemption in the U.S. Copyright Act demonstrates, finding po-
tential commercial use of intellectual property does not inevitably
require the finding of infringement.'8 ' Rather, the copyright statute pro-
vides that the "purpose and the character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur-
poses" is only one of four decisive factors.'82 In other words, another piece
of U.S. intellectual property legislation, based on the same constitutional
177. Mueller notes that the distinction between "experimented on" and "experimented
with" in such situation "may be an exercise in semantics." Mueller, supra note 1, at 40 n.202.
178. See Experimental Use as a Defence to a Claim of Patent Infringement, Association
Internationale pour la Protection de la Propridtd Industrielle Annuaire, 1992/111 [AIPPI Ann.],
at 282-83 $ 3.3. Cf World International Property Organization [WIPO], Draft Treaty Supple-
menting the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as Far as Patents are
Concerned (Patent Law Treaty), Art. 19 Alternative B 3(a)(iii), WIPO Doc. SCP/4/3 (Oct. 2,
2000) (not adopted), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_4/scp_4-3.doc
(proposing to exempt acts from infringement "where the act consists of making or using ex-
clusively for the purpose of experiments that relate to the subject matter of the patented
invention [or for the purpose of seeking regulatory approval for marketing]") (alteration in the
original).
179. This is generally accepted under the European approach, see supra notes 151-153
and accompanying text.
180. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Cf supra notes 125-
130 and accompanying text.
181. See generally Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000).
182. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). See also Mueller, supra note 1, at 42-45.
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grant of power as the patent act, 83 recognizes the principle that the
commercial nature of use alone is not determinative of infringement.
To conclude, the EU approach is better because it better reflects the
patent systems rationale" of incentivizing inventive activity by ensuring
adequate and sufficient patent protection for inventors without creating
unwarranted disincentives by imposing undue restrictions on further
technological development.
VI. THE SAFE HARBOR OF SECTION 271(E)(I)
A. The Uncertain State of Current Law
In 1984, Congress adopted the Hatch-Waxman Act in order to facili-
tate a faster introduction of readily available, cheaper generic drugs as a
response to an aging population. 85 It, inter alia, extends the term of pat-
ents on new drugs to make up for the loss of effective patent duration in
the FDA approval process 1 6 and for an abbreviated drug approval proc-
ess for generic drugs by allowing manufacturers of generic drugs to file
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the FDA.17 An
ANDA application allows researchers to bypass many clinical and pre-
clinical experiments, but requires generic manufacturers to demonstrate
bioequivalence of the new drug with a listed drug."" Except in cases
183. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8 ("The Congress shall have the power... to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
184. Apart from the rationale of the patent system, macro-economic considerations sup-
port an expansion of the experimental use doctrine: without an expansion of the experimental
use doctrine, U.S. industry will be likely to move research abroad to benefit from a broader
experimental use exemption, thus creating jobs and targeting investment outside of, rather than
inside, the United States. Garde, Disparate Treatment, supra note 113, at 265; Harold C.
Wegener & Stephen Maebius, The Looming Crisis Over the Research Use Exception To Patent
Infringement: What Madey Taught Duke University (2003), http://www.foley.com
publications/pub-detail.aspx?pubid=1250. Incidentally, that was one of the reasons why the
EC adopted a Bolar-type provision permitting clinical trials by means of a European directive,
cf infra Part VI.B.
185. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 1984 Stat. 1538 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 35 U.S.C.). See
generally Mossinghoff, supra note 120.
186. Codified as amended in 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2003).
187. Codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2003)
188. Codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). (Furthermore, the ANDA
must show that the proposed label instructions have been approved for the original drug, that
the active ingredients are identical to the original drug, the dosage, route of administration,
and strength are identical, and that the labeling will be identical with the original drugs' label
except for the changes reflecting the different manufacturer. Naturally, the application must
include information required for an original drug application, i.e., information regarding the
complete listing of its components, its composition, description of methods, facilities and
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where the generic company can submit a so-called "paper-NDA" and
show bioequivalence by reference to scientific publications, bioequiva-
lence must be established through a series of experiments. 9
Since such experiments would infringe the original drug's patent un-
der Roche v. Bolar, the generic drug industry successfully lobbied
Congress to provide a safe harbor provision. The industry argued that the
current situation de facto prolonged the patent term because the data
necessary for the submission of an ANDA could only be compiled after
the expiration of the patent.'9° As part of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Con-
gress provided a safe harbor for uses of a patented invention in
connection with the drug approval process in § 271(e)(1), which reads in
its relevant part:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell,
or sell within the United States or import into the United States a
patented invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veteri-
nary biological products.'9 ' (emphasis added)
The provision has been subject to repeated judicial interpretation.' 92
In Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, the Supreme Court gave it a broad meaning to
comprise the testing to develop and submit information for marketing
approval of medical devices.'9 3 Following cases interpreted the reach of
the wording "solely for uses reasonably related" first very narrowly' 94
and then more broadly.'9 However, after the Federal Circuit's decision in
controls, as well as samples of the drug (if required) and its labeling. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(vi)). Cf H.R. REP. No. 98-857(l), at 14-18 (1984), as reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48.
189. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, § 505(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (2003).
190. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 404-05 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff'd,
496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990).
191. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2003).
192. Justice Scalia, writing for the court, called the § 271(e)(1) "not plainly comprehen-
sible on anyone's view" and found that it could not be transformed by interpretation "into an
elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship." Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 496 U.S. 661, 669, 679.
193. Medtronic, 872 F.2d at 406 (involving Class III medical devices-cardiac defibrilla-
tors which are also subject to patent term extension). In a subsequent case, the Federal Circuit
confirmed the availability of the safe harbor for medical devices which are subject to FDA
approval but are not eligible for patent term extension. Abtox Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F3d
1019, 1029-30 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
194. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F Supp. 1379, 1396
(N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd in part on other grounds, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (applying the
exemption only to activities directly involved in seeking FDA approval).
195. See, e.g., Exitron, 122 F.3d at 1029 (activity exempted so long as it is reasonably
related to FDA approval, user's intent or alternative uses irrelevant). Even more broadly, Nex-
ell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Amcell Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Del. 2002) (only activities that
have no objectively reasonable applications towards FDA approval fall out of the scope of
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Integra v. Merck,'96 the Supreme Court's subsequent reversal, 97 and the
recently issued opinion on remand,'98 which will be analyzed below, the
scope of § 271 (e)(1) with respect to the use of research tools remains far
from clear.
1. Integra v. Merck-Facts
Integra owned several U.S. patents on pharmaceutically useful pep-
tides containing a short tri-peptide segment of fibronectin (the RGD-
Peptide)' 99 that promotes cell adhesion by interacting with a,33 receptors
on the cell surface proteins (integrins).2°° A representative claim 8 of the
'525 patent reads:
A substantially pure peptide including as the cell-attachment-
promoting constituent the amino acid sequence Arg-Gly-Arg-R
wherein R is Ser, Cys, Thr or other amino acid, said peptide hav-
ing cell-attachment promoting activity, and said peptide not
being a naturally occurring peptide."'
The invention claimed to improve wound healing and biocompatibil-
ity of prosthetic devices and to facilitate the generation of new blood
vessels (angiogenesis).2 °2 Dr. Cheresh, working for The Scripps Research
Institute (hereinafter: Scripps), discovered that angiogenesis could be
inhibited by blocking the a,33 receptors. He deemed this a promising
means of halting tumor growth by starving the dividing tumor cells as
§ 271(e)); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 E Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998)
(safe harbor applies to infringement of a drug patent for purposes which may be related to
FDA approval, but may serve additional purposes); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No.95 Civ. 8833, 2001 WL 1512597 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (use of pat-
ented drug intermediaries in experiments to research drug analogs is exempted from
infringement).
196. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck 1), 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
197. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
198. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck 11), 496 E3d 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
199. RGD refers to the amino acid sequence arginine-glycine-aspartic acid.
200. Merck 1, 331 F.3d at 862. Integra asserted that Merck violated four of its patents:
U.S. Patents No. 4,988,621 (filed Dec. 10, 1987) (issued Jan. 29, 1991), 4,792,525 (filed Jun.
17, 1985) (issued Dec. 20, 1988), 5,695,997 (filed Jun. 2, 1995) (issued Dec. 9, 1997),
4,879,237 (filed May 24, 1985) (issued Nov. 7, 1989) and 4,789,734 (filed Aug. 6, 1985) (is-
sued Dec. 6, 1988).
201. U.S. Patent No. 4,792,525 (filed June 17, 1985) (issued Dec. 20, 1988). Other pat-
ents were directed to processes involving the attachment properties of the RGD-peptides, see
infra Part VIII.A.
202. See infra Part VIII.A. However, as Judge Newman noted in her dissent, the inven-
tors failed to develop a commercially viable product and thus sold them to Integra. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck 1), 331 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman,
J., dissenting).
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well as a possible means of treating several other diseases."' The ct43 3
receptors are the receptors stimulated by the RGD-peptides2 "
Merck hired Dr. Cheresh and Scripps to identify potential drug can-
didates which may inhibit angiogenesis. After Dr. Cheresh identified
the cyclic peptide EMD 66203, Merck entered into a research agreement
with Scripps and funded the experiments necessary to satisfy the regula-
tory requirements for the implementation of clinical trials with the
identified peptide or a derivative thereof.206 Scripps identified two addi-
tional derivative peptides and conducted several in vitro and in vivo
experiments on the three peptides to determine their specificity, efficacy,
and toxicity with respect to various diseases, as well as the best method
for therapeutically administering the peptides. 2°7 Eventually, in 1997, the
derivative peptide EMD 121974 was chosen for clinical development.08
Scripps also performed basic research on organic mimetics designed to
block a,33 receptors in similar manner and used the RGD-peptides as
"positive controls" for efficacy testing.2°
When Integra learned of the research agreement between Merck and
Scribbs, it offered a license to its RGD patents and sued Merck when
their lengthy licensing negotiations failed.20 Merck contended that the
patents were invalid and that their research fell into the safe harbor of
203. Id. at 862.
204. Id. at 863.
205. Id. at 862.
206. Id.
207. Id.
[The experiments included] modifications in the structure of RGD-containing pep-
tides and investigations of their properties in the Scripps/Merck collaboration,
including: receptor binding assays to investigate the efficacy and specificity of
structural change; angiogenesis/chick CAM assays for inhibition of blood vessel
formation in chick embryos when vessel growth is artificially induced, to study the
mechanism of action, pharmacokinetics, and other properties; angio-matrigel ex-
periments to investigate inhibition of artificially induced vascularization in mice;
cell adhesion assays by spectrophotometric measurement of inhibition of cell at-
tachment to protein, to provide information about mechanisms, efficacy, and other
properties; chemotaxis studies to determine the effect of various peptides on cell
migration over extracellular matrix fibers; use of chick embryos to obtain pharma-
cokinetic data; fluorescent-activated cell sorting to study the effect on the receptor-
ligand binding reaction, to aid in understanding mechanisms of activity; vasculari-
zation of the retina and induced arthritis of the joints, studied with mice and rabbits;
chick CAM assays to study angiogenesis associated with tumor transplantation and
growth in chick embryos; and tumor growth in SCID-mice or nude mice, including
studies of mechanism, pharmacology, and pharmacokinetics.
Id. at 874.
208. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck 1), 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
209. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 199 (2005).
210. Merck 1, 331 F.3d at 863.
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§ 271(e)(1). 21' After trial, a jury found Merck liable for infringing four of
Integra's patents and determined that the safe harbor did not extend to
the experiments conducted between 1995 and 1998, i.e. the in vitro and
in vivo experiments to identify suitable RGD peptides and elucidate their
212properties.
2. The Federal Circuit's Original Decision
On appeal, the Federal Circuit construed the words "solely for pur-
poses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law" very narrowly. 2 3 Analyzing the legisla-
tive history, it affirmed the district court's interpretation that the safe
harbor of § 271 (e)(1) is confined to "activity that 'would contribute
(relatively directly)' to information the FDA considers in approving a
drug," i.e. applies only to experiments providing information which is
actually submitted in FDA approval process.24 It qualified part of the
experiments conducted by Scripps as general biomedical research to
identify new compounds, and, as such, outside of the § 271(e)(1) safe
harbor.
2'5
The majority opinion explicitly mentioned the problem of applying
the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor to research tools and was motivated to a nar-
row construction by its fear that the inclusion of "the Scripps Merck
activities would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees own-
ing biotechnology tool patents. 2 6 Since research tools do not only serve
to identify potential drug candidates in upstream research, but are also
used in downstream experiments which may fall into the safe harbor of
211. Id. at 863.
212. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
To prevail on this defense, [petitioner] must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that it would be objectively reasonable for a party in [petitioner's] and
Scripps' situation to believe that there was a decent prospect that the accused activi-
ties would contribute, relatively directly, to the generation of the kinds of
information that are likely to be relevant in the processes by which the FDA would
decide whether to approve the product in question.
Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. at 200-01. The Judge went further in saying that "[Petitioner] does
not need to show that the information gathered from a particular activity was actually submit-
ted to the FDA." Id.
213. Merck 1, 331 F.3d at 865.
214. Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck 1), 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing Intermedics Inc. v. Ventritex Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991),
aff'd, 991 E2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). The court stated that "[t]he FDA has no interest in the
hunt for drugs that may or may not later undergo clinical testing for FDA approval." Id. at 866.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 867.
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§ 271 (e)(1), a broad reading of the provision would greatly diminish the
commercial benefit owners of patented research tools could expect."7
Dissenting from the majority's construction of § 271(e)(1), Judge
Newman opined that all activities conducted by Merck and Scripps
should be exempted from infringement either under the common law
experimental use exemption or the statutory exemption of § 271(e)( 1).2,8
Her dissent addresses in detail the scope of the common law research
exemption and why her proposed interpretation would not vitiate the
commercial value of biotechnology research tools. 2'9 However, Judge
Newman is not explicit about the extent to which she would apply the
statutory exemption of § 271(e)(1) to the use of research tools for FDA
purposes because she ultimately determined that the RGD peptides were
not used as research tools. 2 20 Nevertheless, one can speculate that she
would make the same distinction between "research on" (exempted) and
"research with" (not exempted) a patented tool that she suggested as ap-
propriate for the common law research exemption.22'
3. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's narrow interpretation
of § 271 (e)( 1) and construed the provision more broadly.222 It agreed with
the Federal Circuit that "basic scientific research on a particular com-
pound, performed without the intent to develop a particular drug or a
reasonable belief that the compound will cause the sort of physiological
effect the researcher intends to induce" is no longer "reasonably related"
in the meaning of § 271(e)(1). 23 However, it stated that
[I]t does not follow from this, however, that § 271(e)(1)'s ex-
emption from infringement categorically excludes either (1)
experimentation on drugs that are not ultimately the subject of
an FDA submission or (2) use of patented compounds in ex-
periments that are not ultimately submitted to the FDA. Under
217. Id.
218. Id. at 874 (Newman J., dissenting) (arguing that there should not be an "intervening
kind of limbo" between exploratory research exempted under the common law exemption and
research for FDA approval exempted under § 271(e)(I) as it would defeat the purpose of both
exemptions).
219. Id. at 874-76.
220. Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck 1), 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
221. Id. at 876.
222. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). Justice Scalia,
writing for a unanimous court, stated that "§ 271(e)(1) provides a wide berth for the use of
patented drugs in activities related to the federal regulatory process" Id. at 193.
223. Id. at 205-06.
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certain conditions, we think the exemption is sufficiently broad
to protect the use of patented compounds in both situations.224
Categorically excluding the first category would ignore the realities
of the drug development process where no one can predict whether a
particular compound will "survive" testing as a potential drug candidate
and will eventually be submitted for FDA approval.225 Similar reasons
apply to the second category because not all experiments necessary to
determine the suitability of potential drug candidates yield information
that is ultimately submitted to the FDA.226 Finally, the court held that all
activities fall into the safe harbor of the statutory exemption where
a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that a patented
compound may work, through a particular biological process, to
produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the compound
in research that, if successful, would be appropriate to include in
a submission to the FDA, that use is 'reasonably related' to the
'development and submission' of information under... Federal
law.227
4. The Federal Circuit Decision On Remand
On remand, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's finding
of infringement and held that all experimental activities under dispute
fell under the safe harbor of § 27 1 (e)(1) because they were conducted to
determine the optimal candidate angiogenesis inhibitor and to comply
2281with requirements of the drug approval process. It determined that the
experiments were conducted after the tumor-inhibiting property of the
RGD-peptide was discovered and were directed to obtaining information
on efficacy, mechanism of action, pharmacology, and phamacokinetics.229
Following the Supreme Court's construction of § 271 (e)(1), the Federal
Circuit determined that the experiments were exempted from infringe-
ment as the information was deemed relevant to the drug approval
224. Id. at 206.
225. Id. at 207. Additionally, as the court noted, a party is often uncertain, especially at
the preclinical stage, what kind of information and in what quantity will be required to receive
the FDA's approval. Id. (citing Intermedics v. Ventritex, 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal.
1991)) ("[Ilt will not always be clear to parties setting out to seek FDA approval for their new
product exactly which kinds of information, and in what quantities, it will take to win that
agency's approval.").
226. Id. at 207-08.
227. Id. at 207.
228. Integra Lifescience 1, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck II) 496 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
229. Id. at 1346-47.
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process and did not constitute inquiry into basic science."O Finally, the
court rejected Integra's contention that only "routine" experiments de-
void of any discovery (i.e. experiments to show bioequivalence) could be
subject to the exemption under § 271(e)(1); to the contrary, it confirmed
that experiments are not deprived of the safe harbor if they yield further
information which lead to a better understanding."23'
The majority expressly did not opine on whether and how far the
safe harbor extends to the use of research tools, finding that the Supreme
Court ruled that the case did not raise the issue and taking into consid-
eration that "the parties emphatically confirmed that research tools were
not at issue. 232 In his separate opinion, however, Judge Rader considered
the issue to be raised when he characterized two of the patents as being
directed to research tools and, therefore, criticized the majority's reversal
of infringement as an improper extension of the safe harbor to research
tools. 233 It is true that the patents in question were directed to research
tools; however, the fear that the majority decision would cast a "large
shadow" over patent protection may not materialize to the extent pre-
dicted, as will be discussed infra VIII. A. 3
5. Analysis
The application of § 271 (e)(1) to the various stages of experimentation
now seems somewhat clearer: basic experimentation does not benefit
from § 271(e)(1), whereas clinical and pre-clinical tests fall under the
scope of § 271(e)(1). Nevertheless, the impact of the Supreme Court deci-
sion on the use of patented research tools is not clear. Some commentators
have interpreted the decision narrowly, only applying § 271(e)(1) to
the patent on the listed drug the generic version is meant to substitute;
235
some favor a broader application to any patented invention used during
the experiments, thus also exempting the use of research tools;
236
230. Id. The court explicitly rejected Integra's argument that only obtaining information
on safety could constitute an acceptable purposed under § 271(e)(1).
231. Id. at 1346-47.
232. Id. at 1348 (stating that the decision "casts no 'large shadow' on the subject of 're-
search tools"').
233. Id. at 1352-53 (Rader J., dissenting-in-part and concurring-in-part); see also 3
MARTIN J. ADELMAN, PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 3.6[2] at n.34 (Matthew Bender 2d ed.
2007).
234. Integra Lifescience 1, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck II) 496 F.3d 1334, 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
235. Cf., e.g., Pfaff, supra note 61, at 267.
236. See, e.g., Bradley J. Olson, The Supreme Court's Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. Opinion Extends the Exemption from Infringement under § 271(e)(J) to
Biotechnology "Research Tools", 3 J. INT'L BIOTECHNOLOGY L. 16 (2006) (interpreting the
decision as "in essence, a new form of compulsory license"); Tara Stuart, Has the Supreme
Court Incorrectly Expanded § 271(e)(1) to Risk a Regulatory Taking?, 5 J. MARSHALL REV.
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and yet others argue that the decision does not make any statement about
research tools at all.237
The better arguments speak in favor of a neutral interpretation,
which is also the view adopted both by the Federal Circuit's majority
opinion and Judge Rader's dissent/concurrence on remand."8 Some may
find the Court's extension of the exception to the "use of patented com-
pounds in experiments that are not ultimately submitted to the FDA" as
ambiguous and interpret this as holding that the exception relates also to
research tools used for the experiments. However, the immediate con-
text, as well as the Court's reasoning, warrant a less inclusive, or at theS 239
very least neutral, reading. Throughout the decision, the court refers
only to "patented inventions" or "patented compounds" which "are ap-
propriate for submissions to the FDA," giving no reason for implying
that the use of research tools is generally exempted under § 271(e)(1). 240
Additionally, the "ominous" footnote 7 of the opinion clearly states that
the Supreme Court did not opine on the scope of research tool patents. 4
Finally, considering that the court determined that the RGD peptides
were not used as research tools, the principle of judicial restraint sup-
INTELL. PROP. L. 216, 229 (2006) (finding the new scope of § 271(e)(1) extremely broad and
including the use of research tools); Li Westerlund, Blocking Effects? Research Tool Patents
and the 'Safe Harbor' Exemption, 174 PAT. WORLD 16 (2005) (stating that the Supreme
Court's decision "effectively diminished the value of research tool patents").
237. See, e.g., Martha M. Rumore, Safe Harbor or Pirate Cove? Merck v. Integra and its
Seeming Impact on International Research Activities, 3 ABA ScITECH LAW, Winter 2007, at
14 (recalling the fact, that the Supreme Court did not opine on whether research tools are
exempted under § 271(e)(1), a disappointment for academia and biotech industry); Jonathan
McPherson, The Impact of the Hatch-Waxman Act's Safe Harbor Provision on Biomedical
Research Tools after Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd, 10 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L.
369, 370 (2006); James Borchardt, Note, Merck v. Integra: § 271(e)(1) and the Common Law
Exemption, 19 J. CORP. L. 943,955 (2007).
238. Merck 1I, 496 F.3d 1334. The majority opinion declined to rule on question because
it determined that the Supreme Court ruled the issue as not raised by this case. Id. at 1348.
While Judge Rader stated in his dissent that the Supreme Court did not express any view on
the issue of research tools, he nevertheless infered that the Supreme Court did not expect to
extend the exception to the use of research tools. Id. at 1350, 1353 (Rader J., dissenting-in-
part and concurring-in-part) ("The Supreme Court simply did not intend to even address re-
search tools, let alone, render research tools valueless for their one and only use-to test and
ascertain information about candidate compounds .... The Supreme Court in Merck did not
expect such a broad result.").
239. Merck v. Integra Lifesciences Inc., 545 U.S. 193, 206-07 (2005).
240. Id. at 207. See also Pfaff, supra note 61, at 267.
241. The court cited Judge Newman's distinction of "[u]se of an existing tool in one's
research is quite different from study of the tool itself" in the same note. Merck v. Integra, 545
U.S. at 206. Nevertheless, it would seem a stretch to interpret the court's citation as "subscrib-
ing to her point of view." But see Pfaff, supra note 61, at 267 for such interpretation. See also
McPherson, supra note 237, at 282-83 (interpreting the allusion to Judge Newman's distinc-
tion as a hint as to how the court would analyze the issue absent further congressional
clarification).
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ports the interpretation that the Supreme Court did not address the im-
pact of the statutory experimental use exemption with respect to the use
of research tools, and only defined at which level experiments can fall
into the safe harbor of § 271 (e)( 1).242
Where does that leave us? The Supreme Court has left a virtually
blank slate for the Federal Circuit to determine whether the use of pat-
ented research tools in experiments that are "reasonably related" falls
into the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1). On remand, the Federal Circuit did
not state a rule on whether the use of research tools is exempted under
§ 271(e)(1), and the court declined to opine on the issue as not being
before the court. As will be shown in section VIII. A. of this Article,
the facts make the case unsuitable for establishing a general rule.24
B. The German Exemption for Clinical Trials
It may seem counter-intuitive to look to a European clinical trial ex-
emption for guidance on the interpretation of the safe harbor provision
of § 271(e)(1), since the European provisions have been inspired by
§ 271(e)(1) and are often referred to as the Roche-Bolar provision.245
Nevertheless, the European provisions can provide some guidance be-
cause the rationale for both provisions is to correct an unintended de
facto term extension for patented drugs and facilitate an early market
debut of cheap generic drugs.246
As discussed above, the distinction between experiments "on" and
"with" the patented invention is settled law in the context of the experi-
mental use exemption. However, no case law exists with respect to the
clinical trials exemption which was introduced to implement the Euro-
pean Directive 2004/27/EC.2 7 The German experimental use exemption
and corresponding provisions in most European countries have generally
been interpreted as not allowing experiments to prove bioequivalence.
Such experiments are deemed as not directed at obtaining new
242. See also McPherson, supra note 237, at 381 (stating that the Supreme Court fol-
lowed its "role within the judiciary branch, leaving legislative activities to elected officials").
243. Integra Lifescience I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck I1) 496 F.3d 1334, 1347-48 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
244. Infra at Part VIII.A.
245. Compare the explicit references to the U.S. provision in the legislative proposal,
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying
down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for
human and veterinary use and establishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medici-
nal Products, at 72-73, 130-31, COM (2001) 404 final, (Nov. 26, 2001).
246. Cf Pub. L. No. 98-417, supra note 185; Council Directive 2004/27/EC, infra note
247.
247. Council Directive 2004/27/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 34 (EC) (amending Directive
2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use). The direc-
tive had to be implemented into national laws by October 30, 2005.
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information on the patented compound but merely at confirming that the
generic product had the claimed properties. 4 ' This restrictive interpreta-
tion stifled competition between original and generic drug manufacturers
and forced manufacturers to conduct the required testing for drug ap-
proval abroad.
To secure a sufficient supply of inexpensive drugs and allow generic
drug producers to conduct the required experiments within its territory,
the European Communities amended the Community code relating to
medicinal products for human use through European Directive
2004/27/EC 49 Besides harmonizing and streamlining the drug approval
process for generic drugs in Europe, the directive introduced a new Bo-
lar-type provision in amended Article 10(6), which stipulates that studies
and trials necessary for generic drug approval and "consequential practi-
cal requirements" are not to be regarded as "contrary to patent rights or
supplemental protection certificates for medicinal products."25
The German legislator implemented the exemption in § 11 No. 2b of
the German Patent Act, which now exempts from the effects of the pat-
ent "[s]tudies and trials and the consequential practical requirements
necessary to obtain a permission to market in the European Union or to
obtain an authorization in the Member States or in third countries ac-
cording to the effective pharmaceutical regulations." '25
The broad wording of the provision does not expressly limit the ex-
ception to experiments on the patented subject matter, which could be
(mis-)understood as exempting from infringement the use of any pat-
ented invention, i.e. including the use of research tools if they are used
248. Cornish, supra note 144, at 753. Reformulating the requirements set forth in the
Clinical Trials decisions, academics defined "experiment" as necessarily presupposing the
existence of uncertainty. See Rolf Pietzcker, Patentrechtliche Fragen bei Klinischen Ver-
suchen-eine Erwiderung [Questions of Patent Law relating to Clinical Trials-A Response],
GRUR INT. 1995, 319, 320; Hieber, supra note 133, at 441; von Meibom & Pitz, Clinical
Trials, supra note 152, at 248; HIDERO NInOKA, KLINISCHE VERSUCHE IM PATENTRECHT
[CLINICAL TRIALS IN PATENT LAW] 276-78 (2003). See also Andries van der Merwe, Experi-
mental Use and Submission of Data for Regulatory Approval, 31 11C 380, 380 (2000).
249. Council Directive 2004/27/EC, supra note 247.
250. Article 10(6) reads: "Conducting the necessary studies and trials with a view to the
application of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 and the consequential practical requirements shall not
be regarded as contrary to patent rights or to supplementary protection certificates for medici-
nal products." Id. at 40. Paragraphs I, 2, 3 and 4 specify the data which has to be submitted for
drug approval process in case of generic drugs. Id.
251. The provision has been introduced as part of the 14th Law amending the German
Pharmaceuticals Act and entered into force on September 6, 2005. The legislative proposals
referred to the provision as a "Roche-Bolar-Rule." See BTDrucks 15/5656 at 1-3, 75-77;
BTDrucks 1515316, at 1-3, 31-34.
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for experiments necessary for the drug approval process. 21' However, the
better arguments favor a more restrictive interpretation.
1. Legislative History
The legislative history of § 1 1 No. 2b as well as the legislative his-
tory of its European root give no indication that the provision should
extend to the use of research tools. Whenever legislators discussed the
necessity to exempt generic drug manufacturers during clinical trials,
reference was only made to the patent or supplementary protection cer-
tificate on the original product.21' Furthermore, the provision needs to be
interpreted in systematic context of the experimental use exemption of
§ 1 1 No. 2 German Patent Act and thus-absent of any diverging intent
of the legislator-needs to be read consistently with the Clinical Trials
jurisprudence limiting the exception to experiments on the patented sub-
214ject matter. Additionally, as will be argued in the next subsection, an
extension to research tools would conflict with higher ranking law.255
2. Constitutional Guarantee of Property Under
Article 14 1 German Basic Law
Patent rights fall under the constitutional guarantee of property un-
der Article 14(1), 1st sentence German Basic Law.16 However, property
rights are not guaranteed without limits and, pursuant to Article 14(1),
2nd sentence of the German Basic Law, the legislator can determine the
boundaries of property rights. The Federal Constitutional Court held that
the experimental use exemption codified in § 11 No. 2 German Patent
Act constitutes a permissible limit on the property rights conveyed by a
252. See Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 16 (citing Wolfgang von Meibom
& Ina vom Feld, Durchgriffsanspriiche (Reach-Through-Anspriiche) bei Patenten fdr For-
schungszwecke [Reach-Through Claims in Patents on Research Uses], in "Festschrift fir
Bartenbach" 398 (2005)).
253. Cf European's provision the Commission's proposal, supra note 245, COM (2001)
404 final, at 72, 130, 197 (provision allows the testing required "prior to the expiry of the
originator product's period of patent protection"). With respect to the German provision, com-
pare the Legislative Proposals BTDrucks 15/5316, at 31, 48, and BTDrucks 15/5656, at 18, as
well as the Final Report of the Committee for Health and Social Security, BTDrucks 15/5728,
at 84. Furthermore, the amendment is not found in legislation directed at amending the Ger-
man patent law, but in a revision of the medicinal laws, which suggests that the legislators
were concerned with the patents covering medicinal products and not with any other patent
affected during the clinical trials. See Pfaff, supra note 61, at 270-71.
254. See Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 16; Pfaff, supra 61, at 271-72.
255. See infra Part VII.C.2. See also Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 16.
256. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverG] [Federal Constitutional Court], May 10, 2000, I
[BvR] 1864195-Klinische Versuche [Clinical Trials], GRUR 2001, 43 (hereinafter: Clinical
Trials IIl). Article 14 reads: "(I) Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed.
Their content and limits shall be defined by the laws."
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patent under Article 14(1), 2nd sentence of the Basic Law.z7 Further-
more, the court confirmed that the German Federal Court of Justice's
interpretation is constitutional:. 8 experiments on a patented invention
can be exempted even if they are not directed at finding a new medical
indication.259 Losses directly incurred by the patentee as a consequence
of the clinical trials have to be accepted because those losses will be lim-
ited if the clinical trials are actually experimental. 260 However, the court
noted that disproportional losses could be incurred if the experimental
use privilege was abused by actually exploiting the patented compound,
and that an extension of the privilege to such cases would violate the
constitutional guarantee of property under Article 14(1), 1st sentence of
the Basic Law.1
6
'
Permitting experiments with biotechnological research tools either
under the experimental use exemption or the clinical trial exemption un-
der § 11 Nos. 2, 2b German Patent Act would allow for the full
exploitation of the patented invention because the research tools would
be used for the very purpose that merited the grant of the patent. The
research tool owner does not benefit from a successful market approval
of the final drug as his patent will regularly not cover the final drug. An
extension of the exemptions to some or all uses of pure research tools
262
would strip the patent right of its value and violate the institutional guar-
antee of property under Article 14(1), 1st sentence of the German Basic
Law.
Accordingly, the use of research tools in experiments would not be
exempted under the § 11 No. 2b German Patent Act.
VII. WHY AN EXTENSION OF EITHER EXEMPTION IS INADVISABLE
Neither a broadly understood common law experimental use exemp-
tion nor a properly construed § 271 (e)(1) should extend the safe harbor
257. Id. at 44.
258. Clinical Trials 11, supra note 133 (rejecting to restrict the scope of the exemption
only to experiments which are directed to finding a new indication). Cf. Clinical Trials 1, su-
pra note 156.
259. Clinical Trials III, supra, note 256, at 44-45.
260. Id. at 45.
261. Id.
262. Philippe Ducor, Research Tool Patents and the Experimental Use Exemption-A
No-Win Situation?, 17 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1027 (1999); Eisenberg, supra note 3, at
1074; Eisenberg, supra note 172, at 225.
263. Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 16; HOLZAPFEL, EXPERIMENTAL USE,
supra note 152, at 330. A different conclusion may be reached for dual purpose research tools,
where the final pharmaceutical product would fall into the scope of the research tool patent
because the patentee could still stop the use of the pharmaceutical product, meaning that the
patent would not yet be stripped of any value. id.
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for the use of a patented research tool beyond experiments on a patented
invention. Under this narrow principle, experiments on research tools are
exempted from infringement liability by § 271(e)(1) whereas the use of
research tools in experiments constitutes patent infringement. As will be
shown below, sfich interpretation is supported by the legislative history,
best conforms to the rationale of the patent system, and stays within the
limits of higher-ranking law.
A. The Legislative History Warrants a Limited
Interpretation of Section 271(e)(1)
An expansion of the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) to the use of research
tools would go beyond the intent of Congress when it adopted this legis-
lation. 6' As noted above, § 271(e)(1) was introduced in part to respond
to Federal Circuit's narrow application of the common law experimental
use exemption in order to allow drug manufacturers to conduct the ex-
periments necessary for the approval of their generic version of a
patented drug.2 65 During the deliberations on § 271 (e)(l), the responsible
House Committee characterized the "nature of the interference with the
rights of the patent holder" as "de minimis" and not "substantial. ' 2 6 The
provision was intended to exempt only the amount of testing necessary
for the drug manufacturers to establish bioequivalence of their generic
drug version during the term of the patent, thus rectifying a defacto ex-
tension of the patent term due to the FDA approval process.267 Since the
research tools are not subject to drug approval, there is no distortion of
the patent term requiring amelioration 268
Extending the provision to the use of research tools would no longer
affect the patentee's rights in the "limited" or "de minimis" way foreseen
by Congress because the commercial value of the patent would be
264. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *20,
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL
429972; Pfaff, supra note 61, at 266. For an even more limited interpretation of the safe har-
bor as not extending to testing directed to finding new drugs, see Stuart, supra note 236, at
236; Paul Wiegel, Was the FDA Exemption to Patent Infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1),
Intended to Exempt a Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Activities in the Development of New
Drugs, 2007 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. FORUM & J. 112901.
265. See supra Part VI.A. See also Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc.,
666 F Supp. 1379, 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (interpreting the legislative history to allow only
testing for bioequivalence).
266. H.R. REP. No. 98-857 (1I), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2686, 2714.
267. Id. at 2692.
268. Stuart, supra note 236, at 234. Cf George Fox, Note, Integra v. Merck: Limiting the
Scope of the § 271(e)(1) Exception to Patent Infringement, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193, 197
(2004) (explaining the rationale of Hatch-Waxman with the need to reduce both "front term"
and "back term" distortion).
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greatly, if not completely, diminished.2 69 Furthermore, as will be argued
in a following section, the extended exception would arise to the level of
a regulatory taking, which would violate the express intent of Con-
270gress.
B. Public Policy Demands a Restrictive Interpretation
Although there are different justifications for a broadly understood
common law experimental use exemption and the safe harbor provision
of § 271(e)(1),27 similar considerations of public policy caution against
exempting the use of research tools from infringement under either ex-
emption.
1. Common Law Experimental Use Exemption
It is questionable whether an extension of the common law experi-
mental use exemption would provide long-term benefits to technological
progress. One might expect that research and development activity in-
creases over the short term, as all existing research tools could be freely
used by any interested researcher. Also, no project would be affected by
a lack of access to a needed research tool, which is arguably in the public
interest. 272 However, free access to inventions assumes that there are, in
fact, inventions to be accessed, and thus can only arise after an invention
has been conceived.273 To limit the patent owner's remedies of injunctive
or monetary relief could deleteriously take away incentives for the crea-
tion of new research tools. 274 There are few reasons for a commercial
269. See Ducor, supra note 262; Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1074; Eisenberg, supra note
172, at 225.
270. H.R. REP. No. 98-857(11), at 29-30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,
2713-14; Stuart, supra note 236, at 231. With regard to regulatory taking, see infra Part
VII.C.I.
271. Whereas the purpose of the common law exemption is to facilitate technological
progress by permitting experiments to obtain new knowledge on the patented invention in all
technical fields, the safe harbor merely permits for the rapid introduction of cheap generic
drugs. See supra, Part VI.A. with regard to § 271(e)(1) and supra Part V.C. with regard to the
common law experimental use exemption.
272. In any case, empirical studies suggest that intellectual property rights are not of
high concern to academic researchers and do not usually stop them from pursuing a research
project. Walsh et al., View from the Bench, supra note 136, at 2002 (Only four out of 32 re-
searchers who were aware of relevant IP rights (of a total of 381 respondents) changed their
research approach and 5 delayed experiments for more than a month). See also infra, Part
VII.B.5.
273. FRIEDRICH-KARL BEIER & JOSEPH STRAUS, DER SCHUTZ WISSENSCHAFTLICHER
FORSCHUNGSERGEBNISSE [THE PROTECTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH RESULTS] (1982), mar-
ginal note 78; Ducor, supra note 262, at 1028; Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 14.
274. Mueller, supra note 1, at 47 n.235 (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P.
Merges, Opinion Letter As To the Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated With the Iden-
tification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 19 (1995)).
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enterprise to invest in the development of a new research tool without a
chance to recoup the investment and realize a profit.275 As patents for
their developed technologies are often the only asset for biotechnological
tool companies, an evisceration of this value could drive these compa-
276
nies out of business. Inaccessability to a particular technology can
serve as a powerful stimulant to design around and find alternative
means, which may provide a better solution to the problem at hand . 7
Consequently, research tools would increasingly have to be devel-
oped by non-for-profit research institutions or in-house by the companies
needing them, diminishing the highly successful diversification and spe-
cialization of the biotechnology industry. Presumably, this would lead
to a decrease in innovation because it would dry up the contribution of
• • 279
small- and medium-sized companies, who are the most innovative.
Furthermore, even assuming that the industry giants would succeed
in developing the necessary tools themselves, the very nature of research
tools-their use in laboratories-makes them a highly suitable candidate
for trade secret protection because they are used only in a controlled en-
vironment by highly educated personnel. Without a guarantee of
exclusivity, a firm would have no reason to disclose the research tool,
thus depriving the public of learning of (and studying) the invention.
The kind of technology transfer between firms, which is facilitated
275. Stuart, supra note 236, at 234-35. See also Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1074 ("An
experimental use exemption seems most likely to undermine critical patent incentives when
the researcher is an ordinary consumer of an invention with a primary or at least significant
market among research users. For example, an exemption from infringement liability for re-
search users of a patented laboratory machine would effectively eliminate the benefits of
patent protection for the invention.").
276. See Ducor, supra note 262, at 1027; Michel, supra note 134, at 369-70; M. Patricia
Thayer & Richard A. De Liberty, The Research Exemption to Patent Infringement: The Time
Has Come for Legislation, 41 J. Biolaw & Bus. 1, 7 (2000); HOLZAPFEL, EXPERIMENTAL USE,
supra note 152, at 329-3 1.
277. State Indus. v.A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("One of the
benefits of a patent system is its so-called 'negative incentive' to 'design around' a competi-
tor's products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the
marketplace.").
278. See Wolfgang von Meibom & Ina vom Feld, Durchgriffsanspruiche (Reach-
Through-Anspriiche) bei Patenten fir Forschungszwecke [Reach-Through Claims in Patents
on Research Uses], in FESTSCHRIFT FOR BARTENBACH 385 (2005) (referring to the progressing
and successful specialization in pharmaceutical research).
279. Cf. Aggarwal et al., supra note 30, at 643 (considering small-and medium-sized
enterprises as playing a key role as suppliers of knowledge in the biotech sector); HOLGER
PATZELT, BIOENTREPRENEURSHIP IN GERMANY 19 (2005), http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/
dokserv?idn=979509874&dokvar=d I &dok-ext=pdf&filename=979509874.pdf (last accessed
Jan. 3, 2008) ("Since modem biotechnological methods are most efficiently invented and de-
veloped in an academic and entrepreneurial atmosphere, it is difficult for pharma firms to
build up these technologies internally.").
280. Stuart, supra note 236, at 234-35 (comparing such extension to a general compul-
sory licensing of research tools). See also Mireles, supra note 2, at 216.
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through the publication of the patent specification, will be severely cur-
tailed and result in a wasteful duplication of research and development
efforts, as each firm would have to develop the (same) tool itself.
Circling back to the distinction between "research on" and "research
with" a patented tool, a further difference between the two categories
deserves mentioning. Research "on" a patented tool to further under-
standing of its technology absolutely cannot be conducted without
experimenting on that invention. On the other hand, only a small minor-
ity of research projects would seem to absolutely require the use of one
particular research tool. Admittedly, there will always be a "best" re-
search tool, and a research project could progress faster or at a lower
cost with its use rather than with one that is less effective. However, as
discussed above, a decision to change the research trajectory need not
have a negative overall welfare effect.28' Finally, higher license fees for
more effective tools may be the appropriate prize to stimulate the con-
tinuous innovation of research tools.
2. Section 271(e)(1)
This same policy consideration, i.e. the preservation of the necessary
incentives for research tool manufacturers, counsels against extending
the safe harbor to the use of research tools. The rationale of § 271(e)(1)
is to facilitate the early introduction of cheap generic drugs and research
tools, which can significantly contribute to shaving time and money off
the drug development process.282 Of course, if the common law experi-
mental use exemption continues to apply in the narrow form established
by the current state of law,283 the incentive to invest would not be dimin-
ished to the same extent because there is still a market for research tools
outside the domain of clinical trials for FDA approval. However, even
where a market for research tools remains, the incentive provided by the
patent grant could be dangerously impaired.2
281. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
282. See, e.g., Malakoff & Service, supra note 52, at 1193 ("Aided by new technologies
that enable researchers to rapidly screen thousands of genes and their protein products for
potentially useful properties, the companies sped from gene identification to product testing in
just eight months, shaving at least two years off the typically long and costly drug-discovery
process'").
283. See supra Part V.A.
284. Mireles, supra note 2, at 214-15. See also Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1074 ("[A]n
exemption from infringement liability for research users would deprive patent holders of some
of the social value of their inventions, thereby reducing the value of patents and weakening
patent incentives. Whether such an exemption is nonetheless desirable in the interest of pro-
moting continuing scientific progress is ultimately an empirical question.").
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3. Why A Liability Rule Should Also Be Rejected
Various proposals have been made for adopting a liability rule for
research tool patents.28 Under the liability rule concept, patents no
longer confer exclusivity but only give the patentee the right to demand
216
reasonable compensation for the use of the patented invention. This
concept is based on the argument that patents on (upstream) research
tools impede the innovation process, and that unfettered access to re-
search tools best serves the public interest in stimulating the
technological and economic progress.287 An exemption distinguishing
between basic research and commercial research will be impossible to
administer in practice because basic research can often result in highly
practicable applications. 2 " Likewise, research performed in laboratories
of commercial enterprises can produce scientific discoveries.289 Finally,
the ex-post determination of appropriate compensation for the use of a
research tool patent would raise considerable difficulties.
290
Even if practical, such models would violate obligations under the
TRIPS Agreement (especially Articles 27(1), 28(1) and 30) for the same
reasons that an extension of an experimental use exemption to the use of
285. See, e.g., Derzko, supra note 3, at 388-408 (proposing a differentiated liability rule
for research tool patents depending on the type of entity using the tool (public vs. for-profit)
and the intended use (basic science vs. development of commercial product)); Eisenberg,
supra note 3, at 1078 (proposing the exemption of the use of "an invention in subsequent re-
search in the field of the invention, which could potentially lead to improvements in the
patented technology or to the development of alternative means of achieving the same pur-
pose" and with a compensation for the patent owner only in appropriate cases); Mueller, supra
note I, at 54-60 (further developing Eisenberg's proposal and arguing for a liability rule with
ex post royalty determined based on the market value of products developed through the use
of the patented research tool); Feit, supra note 77, at 840 (proposing to allow for the making
and using of patented technology for significant improvements, with the sale of resulting
products being excused from infringement of the underlying technology). For a detailed
analysis of the socio-economic arguments in favor of and against the introduction of a liability
rule in general see Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules
Govern Information?, 85 TEx. L. REV. 783 (2007); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liabil-
ity Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1293, 1302-07 (1996). Particularly with regard to research tools, see HOLZAPFEL, EXPERI-
MENTAL USE, supra note 152, at 334-36, 344-48.
286. See Merges, supra note 285, at 1302 (regarding the general liability rule frame-
work).
287. But see Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1075-76 (stating that a broad exemption may
stimulate inventive activity by permitting free access to necessary resources while at the same
time depressing the inventive activity by reducing the incentive, and observing the difficulty of
assessing the net impact on willingness to conduct research).
288. Eisenberg, supra note 172, at 195-96.
289. Id.
290. Cf Mueller, supra note 3, at 979 ("Although courts are adept at computing reason-
able royalty compensation for past infringements, it is unclear that the same judicial expertise
could be applied without significant modification to the case of prospective, ongoing experi-
mental use.").
Spring 20081
420 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 14:367
research tools would fail to comply with the TRIPS obligations.2 9' Fur-
thermore, a general liability rule could not be justified under the
compulsory licensing provision of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 92
Even if all other conditions were satisfied, each of the cases would have
to be considered on its individual merits (Article 31(a) of TRIPS) and
would be subject to judicial review (Article 31(1) of TRIPS), which
would result in markedly different proceedings than those suggested un-
der the liability rule concepts.
4. Complementary Measures to Facilitate Access
As argued above, the distinction under the European approach would
preserve the necessary incentives for the creation of research tools. As a
consequence of preserving the patentee's exclusive right, some situations
may arise where strategic bargaining will prevent access to a particular
resource.2 93 Nevertheless, complementary measures to facilitate improved
access to needed research tools exist which better conform to the princi-
ples of a market economy than either the extension of exemptions or a
liability rule concept.
a. Facilitating Access to Government Funded Research Tools
The commercial sector spends a very small portion of its funds on
early stage R&D and is predominantly focused on evolutionary R&D. 94
This suggests that a significant proportion of research tools are devel-
oped under government-funded programs, mainly through NIH grants.
Access to research tools created through NIH-funded research could be
facilitated by including a provision in the grant that requires non-
discriminatory licensing of the research tool to any party, similar to the
principle of "license of right" in other patent jurisdictions.295 The ration-
ale of the patent system is different for product companies and tool
companies: product companies have an incentive to invest/commercialize
291. See infra Part VII.C.2.
292. But see Mueller, supra note I, at 58 n.283 (rather summarily stating that her pro-
posal of limiting the exemption to cases "where the research tool is not readily accessible
through licensing or purchase in the marketplace is in keeping with the 'failure of private
bargaining' restriction on compulsory licensing" under Article 31 of TRIPS).
293. See, e.g., Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown:
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 78 & nn.6-8 (1994).
294. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ATP Report, supra note 43, at 2. For a detailed analysis,
see LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB & PHILIP. E. AUERSWALD, BETWEEN INVENTION AND INNOVATION
42-47 (2002), available at http://www.belfercenter.org/files/betweeninnovation.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 3, 2008).
295. See Garde, Supporting Innovation, supra note 27, at 276-84 (discussing the concept
of license of right in European statutory provisions and suggesting that the NIH includes such
provisions in their grants with respect to research tools).
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due the expensive development process, whereas tool companies are in-
centived to invent, which would need to be balanced with the research
grant system to maintain the same rate of invention. 96
Alternatively, government agencies could exercise their statutory
march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act and compel the licensing of
invention derived from previously funded research . 7 However, the NIH
has refrained from ever exercising that right thus far.298
b. Last Resort Compulsory Licensing
It remains a possibility that free market negotiations may fail to fa-
cilitate access to research tools for the continuation of a socially useful
and desirable research project. 99 In such cases, the grant of a compulsory
license may be appropriate. A compulsory license would be less intrusive
on the patent owner's exclusive rights than a liability rule, which is a
general extension of the experimental use extension to the use of re-
search tools. °° Article 31 of TRIPS limits the member states' freedom togrant compulsory licenses.3°' It sets certain minimum standards that the
296. Cf Garde, Supporting Innovation, supra note 27, at 277-78 (arguing that only the
incentive to invent has to be balanced where public access to research tools should be facili-
tated through licenses of right).
297. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000).
298. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 48, at 294-95 (suggesting that the procedure of exer-
cising the march-in right is too cumbersome). Mireles, who argues in favor of facilitating
access through an increase of patent pools, suggests an amendment to the provision that would
allow the government to transfer a non-exclusive license to patented research tools developed
under government funding to patent pools created by industry participants if the patentee un-
reasonably opposes the licensing of his research tools to the pool. Mireles, supra note 2, at
230-34. For an example of a case in which the NIH denied exercising its right, see Cell-Pro,
Inc. March-In Petition (Mar. 3, 1997) and In Re Petition of CellPro, Inc. (Aug. 1, 1997), both
available at http://www.nih.gov/icd/od/foia/cellpro. See also Amy R. Schofield, The Demnise of
Bayh-Dole Protections Against the Pharmaceutical Industry's Abuses of Government-Funded
Inventions, 32 J.L. MED. ETHICS 777, 778 (2004) (analyzing the case in detail).
299. The previously described measures-even if applied extensively--could not be
used to facilitate access to research tools developed without government funding.
300. Cf Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 17; HOLZAPFEL, EXPERIMENTAL
USE, supra note 152, passim; von Meibom & Pitz, supra note 149, at 30-33. However, em-
pirical studies identified only isolated cases of abuse of patent rights which could justify the
grant of a compulsory license. See NIH, RESEARCH ToOLS, supra note 71; Ducor, supra note
262, at 1028; OECD, supra note 102, at 10, 45-47, 77; John P. Walsh et al., Working Through
the Patent Problem, 299 Sci. 1021 (2003); JOSEPH STRAUS ET AL., GENETIC INVENTIONS AND
PATENT LAW: AN EMPIRICAL SURVEY OF SELECTED GERMAN R & D INSTITUTIONS 20-22
(2004).
301. Article 5A of the Paris Convention imposes additional limitations as it prohibits the
grant of a compulsory license for failure to work the invention within a certain period after the
date for the patent grant. For an analysis of both provisions and their relationship, see Joseph
Straus, Implications of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, in FROM GAT TO
TRIPS-THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 203-08 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker, eds. 1996). See generally Sara M.
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compulsory licensing provisions of most European countries track
closely.30 2 However, the efficacy of compulsory licensing provisions has
always been that their mere existence facilitates contractual license ne-
gotiations, and thus few compulsory licenses have actually been
301granted .3
As noted at the outset of this article, compulsory licensing provi-
sions are alien to U.S. patent law and are unlikely to be adopted in the
near future." 4 However, despite the absence of compulsory licensing
provisions in the US Patent Act and the almost automatic grant of a per-
manent injunction upon a finding of patent infringement under previous
case law, °5 there have been several cases where a court has determined
that a patent was infringed but denied injunctive relief on equitable con-
siderations. In its recent decision, eBay v. Mercexchange, the Supreme
Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions under the TRIPS Agreement: Balancing Pills and
Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941 (2000).
302. See Grace K. Avedissian, Global hnplications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift To-
ward Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of "Super-Terrorism ", 18
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 237 (2003) for an overview of U.S. and foreign positions towards com-
pulsory licensing of research tools. On June I1, 2007, the Swiss Council of States approved
the proposed amendments to the Swiss Federal Law on Patent for Inventions, which include,
inter alia, a compulsory licensing provision for biotechnological research tools. See Law of
June 22, 2007 available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2007/4593.pdf (last accessed Jan. 3,
2008) (amending the Federal Law on Patents for inventions). The new Article 40b provides for
a right to a non-exclusive license for the use of patented biotechnological research tools, with
the terms of the license to be judicially determined where negotiations fail. See id. at Article
40e(l). It seems questionable, however, that a statutory provision codifying the right to a li-
cense for a group of inventions observes the requirement of Article 31(a) of TRIPS, namely
that the decision on the grant has to be based on individual merits.
303. Even prior to the limitations imposed to TRIPS, compulsory licensing occurred
only rarely. See Straus, supra note 301, at 208. The frequency of compulsory licenses granted
in industrialized countries after the adoption of TRIPS has certainly not increased. In Ger-
many, there had been only 12 applications for a compulsory license between 1961 and 1991,
and only one was granted. See von Meibom & Pitz, supra note 149, at 30-32. No compulsory
licenses have been granted since.
304. See supra note 6.
305. In a decision later vacated by the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit recited its
general rule that "that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have
been adjudged", and that "courts have in rare instances exercised their discretion to deny in-
junctive relief in order to protect the public interest." Mercexchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401
F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). See also Mueller, supra note
3, at 967-68 (reporting on the repeated rejection of remedies to infringement which would
resemble compulsory licensing); Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation:
Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 853, 880-91 (2003) (analyzing six cases where compulsory licenses to pharmaceutical
patents were ordered by the FTC under consent decrees as an antitrust remedy).
306. Cf, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1987 WL 123997 (C.D.
Cal. 1987), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (continuing supply of infringer's medical test
kits not marketed by patentee required by public interest); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis.
Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941, 955-56 (9th Cir. 1945) (finding patentee's refusal to
allow irradiation of oleomargarine, which would have aided or cured rickets in consumers, to
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Court held that even after a finding of infringement, the decision to grant
or deny a permanent injunction remains governed by equitable consid-
erations."' Injunctive relief is to be granted only after the application of a
four-factor test. The patentee must show that (1) he has suffered an ir-
reparable injury, (2) that available remedies, such as monetary damages,
are insufficient to compensate for that injury, (3) that a remedy in equity
is warranted in view of a balance of hardships of patentee and infringer,
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.30 8
With the Supreme Court's eBay decision, a sword of Damocles,
similar to the existence of a compulsory licensing provision, hangs over
the patentee's head as he can no longer count on obtaining a permanent
injunction quasi-automatically when his patent is infringed. A stringent
application of this test, especially of the public interest factor, could
benefit researchers who are unable to negotiate adequate access to re-
search tools where the use of a specific research tool is crucial for the
pursuit of an identified research goal, such as the treatment of a particu-
lar disease.
5. Why Differential Treatment for Universities is Inappropriate
Different proposals have been made to treat universities and other
non-profit organizations preferentially and to permit their use of research
tools.3°9 However, as will be argued in this subsection, the distinction
between permissible research on a patented invention and impermissible
be against the public interest). See also Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858,
865-66 (remanding after a finding of infringement for determination on the grant of injunctive
relief).
307. eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
308. Id. at 389. The eBay decision seems to make redundant the change to § 283, as
originally proposed in § 7 of the Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795. The contested pro-
posal-if implemented-would have weakened the strong pre-eBay presumption for
permanent injunctive relief after a finding of infringement, Christopher M. Holman, Biotech-
nology's Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PRop. L. 318, 322
(2006). The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) was adamant about removal of the
provision curtailing the grant of permanent injunctions. See Statement of Robert Chess, supra
note 19, at 6. As a matter of fact, the implementation of the proposed language would
strengthen the position of the patent owner post-eBay, as the infringer would have to affirma-
tively show that a stay of the injunction would not result in irreparable harm to the patent
owner and that the balance of hardships does not favor the owner of the patent. Under eBay,
the patent owner has the burden of proof that the four factor test is satisfied; additionally, Sec-
tion 7 of H.R. 2795 would only weaken the presumption in the case of a decision which can
be appealed, whereas eBay still applies the four-factor test to decisions that can no longer be
appealed. The new proposals H.R. 1908 / S. 1145 do not include a proposal to restrict the
grant of injunctive relief.
309. See, e.g., Derzko, supra note 3 (distinguishing, inter alia, based on the profit or
non-profit status of the researching entity).
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research with a patented invention should apply equally to industrial re-
search and to research by non-profit institutions.
Historically, basic (or upstream) research results were predominantly
published without attaining patent protection because the prestige and
reputation resulting from the successful completion and publication of a
research project was sufficient motivation."' This practice led to direct
enrichment of the public domain and did not restrict the use of these
results for further research. 3 2 However, the idea that universities are dis-
interested temples of knowledge, and thus their accumulation and
dissemination of knowledge should be favored by a broader exemption,
is no longer apposite in view of the profound changes that the Bayh-
Dole Act has brought upon the previously non-commercial and purely
research-oriented academic landscape.' 3 The distinction between up-
stream non-profit institutions conducting basis research and downstream
for-profit companies researching practical applications is reflective of
the 1980s, but does not correspond with today's reality.
31 4
310. See Cai, supra note 48, at 191 which considers a bright-line elimination of the ex-
perimental use exception for universities as they aggressively enforce their patent rights to not
be unfair, and thus universities should be reciprocally liable to infringement litigation. Fur-
thermore, public universities still have the benefit of sovereign immunity, but this does not
extend to private universities. Id. The European experimental use exemption does not distin-
guish at all between research conducted by universities and that conducted by for-profit
enterprises, as it is solely focused on the object of the research and ignores further (commer-
cial) motivation. See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text. See also Cornish, supra
note 144, at 736 (finding that national European courts have moved back from drawing "a
strategic distinction between academic research and research in industry' which reflects the
closer assimilation of basic and applied science, especially in the area of biotechnological and
biomedical research).
311. See Eisenberg, supra note 172, at 181 ("Universities, where much of the research
was conducted, encouraged the dissemination of research results through publication and
occasionally showed a positive aversion to patenting discoveries'") Academic researchers are
motivated by the professional recognition they receive for original contributions. Id. at 183-
84.
312. ld. at 184.
313. Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 110 (1999) ("[T]he legal developments of the 1980s
and 1990s have generated a large variety of academic-industrial relationships .... [S]ome
academic-industrial relationships resemble commercial joint ventures."). See Eisenberg, supra
note 129, at 1019 (viewing universities as more vulnerable to patent infringement suits as they
have become "increasingly aggressive as patent owners [and thus] have compromised their
claim to disinterested stewardship of knowledge in the public interest.").
314. Cockburn, supra note 43, at 388-90; Lynn E. Nimtz et al., University-Industry
Partnerships: Meeting the Challenges with High Tech Partner, 27 SRA J. 9, 9 (1996) ("To-
day's knowledge-based, technological society demands much from higher education and the
corporate world-demands that often can be met through effective university-industry part-
nerships."); NIH, RESEARCH ToOLS, supra note 71 ("Biomedical researchers increasingly
chose to collaborate with entrepreneurial companies that understood and valued basic science
... ). See generally Powell & Owen-Smith, supra note 44.
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While non-commercial research still makes up the bigger part of their
work, university researchers have become more intensively engaged in
commercial activities.' The commercial component of their research can
hardly be considered insignificant when university-private industry coop-
erations have added $41 billion to the U.S. economy and supported
270,000 jobs in 1999.316 The distinctions between academic and research
institutions and for-profit enterprises have become more and more difficult
to ascertain. Close cooperation and overlap between these formerly dis-
tinct sectors has increased greatly, partly due to the success of the Bayh-
Dole Act.3 7 This change is seen in the increase of corporate-sponsored
research in universities, which rose from $236 million in 1980 to $1.3 bil-
lion in 1992."8 Further evidence of closer cooperation is highlighted by
increased patenting, 9 increased licensing activities,320 and the (sometimes
aggressive) enforcement of intellectual property rights by academic and
research institutions.32'
Equal treatment under law is not unfair where academic and research
institutions conduct commercial research and compete with for-profit
enterprises. Even when universities and other non-profit organizations
are subject to the same rules as commercial entities, they enjoy a de
315. Industry funding of university research rose from 2.7% in 1970 to 6.9% in 1990 and
remained somewhat stable at the level, accounting for 7% of university research funding in
2001 with declining trend. WALSH ET AL., supra note 107, at II (citing to data of the National
Science Board 2004).
316. Mireles, supra note 2, at 156 (citing DAVID M. EPSTEIN, ECKSTROM'S VOL. 2 Li-
CENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS § 11.16 (2003)).
317. See Mueller, supra note 1, at 33-38. Nelsen partially attributes the increased inter-
action of universities with the private sector to the reduction in government funding of
research and development as the result of the attempts to balance the federal budget and the
decreased spending for military research following the decline of communism, Nelsen, supra
note 47, at 1460. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 172, at 179 (stating that "[t]he sudden juxtaposi-
tion of commercial incentives and scientific norms has been particularly striking in the
biomedical sciences, in part because of the strong public interest in health-related research and
in part because of the rapid onset and proliferation of university-industry research relation-
ships in biotechnology fields following decades of predominantly public funding").
318. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ATP REPORT, supra note 43, at 6.
319. University patenting has increased from less than 250 in 1980 to more than 3,800 in
2004. See AUTM SURVEY, supra note 45, at intro. 2; since 1993, more than 34,500 patents
have been granted to institutions participating in the AUTM survey. Id. at 2.
320. Between 1991 and 1995, nearly 5,400 licenses were granted by universities; more
than 250 companies were founded directly through university licensing in 1996. Nelsen, supra
note 47, at 1460. Since 1980, more than 4,500 companies have been created based on licenses
from universities, hospitals and research organizations, AUTM SURVEY, supra note 45, at 3.
321. See, e.g., Univ. Of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(patent infringement suit by university patent holder against drug manufacturer); Marcia Bari-
naga, Biotech Patents: Genentech, UC Settle Suit for $200 Million, 286 SCi. 1655 (1999)
(discussing the patent infringement suit between the University of California and Genentech);
Eisenberg, supra note 129, at 1018 (reporting the patent infringement suit between the Univer-
sity of Minnesota and Glaxo-Wellcome).
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facto privilege over industrial research.22 Patents are still unlikely to be
asserted against university researchers even without a meaningful ex-
perimental use exemption, and such patent infringement suits are
unlikely to become more frequent in the wake of a broadened exemp-
tion.123 Commercial enterprises are generally reluctant to sue non-profit
enterprises, partly because they are concerned with their public image
and do not want to be perceived as impairing university research. As an
example, when Roche filed its suit against more than 40 American uni-
versities and research institutions (including Stanford, Harvard, MIT and
The Scripps Research Institute) and more than 200 individual research-
ers, Roche maintained that it was not concerned with their use of
Roche's patented Taq polymerase for "pure research" purposes, but
would have to enforce their patent rights if the researchers engaged in
"highly practical" research with the potential of making profits. 24 Even
DuPont, whose aggressive licensing approach has caused concerns in
academic research, offered "free" research licenses to NIH scientists or
grantees for non-commercial research to its OncoMouse and Cre-LoxP
technologies and only charged a license fee when the respective animals
321are used in commercial activities, e.g. in drug screening.
This "indulgent" attitude by commercial enterprises is mirrored by
the predominantly careless, if not ignorant, attitudes of academic re-
searchers who largely ignore patent rights when conducting their126
research. Furthermore, even when commercial enterprises attempt to
322. Walsh et al., View from the Bench, supra note 136, at 2002 ("Our research thus
suggests that 'law on the books' need not be the same as 'law in action' if the law on the books
contravenes a community's norms and interests."). But see Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 48, at
296 (deeming it "foolhardy for nonprofit researchers to rely on the forbearance of patent hold-
ers" in view of individual examples of aggressive licensing approaches).
323. Cf Nelson, supra note 2, at 467 (Industry has granted a de facto experimental use
exemption to universities. However, companies have become more reluctant to do so as they
view universities as competitors to their own research efforts for achieving patentable practical
results; additionally, as they have to increasingly license patented research results of universi-
ties, they feel more comfortable to reciprocate through the experimental use exemption.).
324. Mueller, supra note 1, at 3 (citing Bruce Rubenstein, La Roche and Promega in Tug
of War Over Enzyme; DNA-Testing Tool Patent at Issue, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 1996, at
28).
325. See Eliot Marshall, The Mouse That Prompted a Roar, 277 Sci. 24 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Marshall, Mouse]; Eliot Marshall, Intellectual Property: DuPont Ups Ante on Use of
Harvard's OncoMouse, 296 Sci. 1212 (2002). Even though DuPont offered free licenses for
both technologies, academics perceived the license terms as burdensome and restrictive, as the
patented mice could only be shared with researchers who had signed the license agreement.
Id. The president of the U.S. National Academy of Science, Bruce Alberts, characterized the
restrictive license terms on the Cre-loxP as a commercial barrier to basic research. Marshall,
Mouse, supra, at 25. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 48, at 296 (finding a general practice of
informal prize discrimination for licensing to industry and academia).
326. See Eyal H. Barash, Experimental Use, Patents, and Scientific Progress, 91 Nw. U.
L. REV. 667, 698 (1997) ("University researchers rarely check the patent literature to deter-
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impose prohibitive licensing terms, academic research institutions are
not defenseless but can muster considerable clout to achieve more per-
missive licensing terms, e.g. with the help of the NIH.327
C. Legal Restrictions Bar an Extension
1. Constitutional Restraints-The "Takings Clause"
As shown above, the commercial value of a patented invention that
is solely or predominantly used for research purposes would greatly
decrease, if not completely disappear, if the use of research tools is
exempted for experiments under § 271(e)(1) or the common law ex-
emption. Since patents are recognized as property rights under
U.S. law, the permissibility of eviscerating such patents raises constitu-
tional questions under the Fifth Amendment.* A regulatory taking
occurs when the government takes either the entire property right, or
substantially deprives its owner of his rights so that the property is de
facto taken."' In 1984, the Supreme Court clarified in Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto that the takings clause is applicable to intellectual property.332
When Congress adopted the limited safe harbor of § 271(e)(1), it consid-
ered the restrictions of the takings clause, but determined that the safe
harbor did not rise to the level of a taking and thus would not cause con-
333
stitutional concerns.
However, an extension of the safe harbor to permit any use of re-
search tools needs to be evaluated differently and appears to rise to the
mine whether their proposed research will infringe on any patents."); Walsh et al., View from
the Bench, supra note 136, at 2002 (surveying the impact of patents on research choices in
academia and reporting that even after Madey, only 5% of the respondents regularly check for
existing patents in their field of research).
327. In the licensing of the Cre-loxP mouse technology mentioned supra note 325, Du-
Pont initially included reach-through clauses in their license agreements. However, after the
NIH threatened to boycott the technology unless academic researchers were granted access on
more reasonable terms, DuPont agreed to the license the technology on less restrictive terms.
See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between NIH and DuPont (Jul. I, 1998), available
at http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/policies-and-guidelines.html (last accessed Jan. 3, 2008).
328. See supra notes 274-275 and accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730
(2002).
330. The Fifth Amendment reads: "Private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend V.
331. See Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
332. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003--04 (1984).
333. H.R. REP. No. 98-857(I), at 27-30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,
2713-14. However, Congress reached that conclusion after analyzing only the rather limited
scope of the exception under debate, i.e. exempting testing on generic drugs to show bio-
equivalence with already FDA approved drugs; not for the use for experiments of new
innovative drugs or for the use of inventions not intended for FDA approval.
Spring 20081
428 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 14:367
level of a taking under the Penn Central33 4 balancing test. Under this test,
three factors must be taken into consideration: (1) the economic impact
of the regulation on the property owner; (2) the character of governmen-
tal regulatory action; and (3) the extent the regulation interferes with
reasonable "investment-backed expectations." '335 In her analysis of the
Supreme Court's Merck decision and its compatibility with the takings
clause, Stuart convincingly concludes that an extension of the safe har-
bor for pure research tools would constitute a regulatory taking, but
considers the situation more ambiguous with respect to patents on re-
search tools which would allow the owner to dominate a final
pharmaceutical product.1 6 In the latter case--dual purpose research
tools-the detrimental effect on the investment-backed expectations
caused by the uncompensated use of the research tool may be offset by
the fact that an approved drug would fall in the scope of the patent and
likely result in the payment of appropriate license fees for the exploita-
tion of the drug.337
As a consequence, while extending the scope of the safe harbor to
the use of research tools may not constitute a regulatory taking in all
cases of research tool patents, a taking would presumably occur in a
large number of cases. A general rule, meant to replace the case-by-case
differentiation required under the Penn Central balancing test, must limit
the safe harbor to experimentation on the patented subject matter and
refrain from extending it to the use of research tools in experiments in
order to eliminate any risk of a regulatory taking3' 8
2. Restraints Imposed by the TRIPS Agreement
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) entered into force on January 1, 1995 as part of the
agreement establishing the World Trade Organization.3 39 The TRIPS
Agreement was concluded after intensive negotiations to "reduce distor-
334. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
335. Id. at 124.
336. Stuart, supra note 236, at 231-33.
337. Cf. id. at 233 (finding it difficult to determine the extent of encroachment on Telios'
property rights as Merck-even after gaining FDA approval-would not have been allowed to
sell the tri-peptide under § 271 (e)(1))
338. See id. at 234-35.
339. Article 11, Section 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization binds all of its members to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights ("TRIPS"). Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144. For an account of the negotiating history, see
Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (2d ed. 2003). For the
effect of the TRIPS Agreement on the field of patent law, see Straus, Implications of TRIPs,
supra note 301. The legal texts of the TRIPS Agreement and the WTO Agreement, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-eIegalelegal-e.htm.
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tions and impediments to international trade" and set minimum stan-
dards for the protection of intellectual property rights.14 Both Germany
and the United States are contracting parties to TRIPS and are thus
bound by its limitations, which dictate restricting the experimental use
exemption to research on the patented invention.
a. Articles 28(1) and 30
Article 28(1) of the TRIPS Agreement enumerates the minimum
rights a patent confers on its owner, namely the exclusive right to "pre-
vent third parties not having the owner's consent from the acts of:
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes
that product. '34' Whereas any of the stated activities would, in principle,
infringe a patent and could be enjoined by the patentee, the member
states may introduce exceptions to the right conferred within the limits
of Article 30 of TRIPS, which reads:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not un-
reasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the pat-
ent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties.
Article 30 of TRIPS is generally understood as a compromise incor-
porating the generally accepted principle that actions should not
constitute patent infringement if it stifles technological progress . 2 While
340. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instru-
ments-Results of the Uruguy Round, 33 I.L.M. 333 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]
(preamble).
341. Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement reads:
Rights Conferred
I. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third
parties not having the owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offer-
ing for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product;
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third
parties not having the owner's consent from the act of using the process, and
from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these pur-
poses at least the product obtained directly by that process.
2. Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the
patent and to conclude licensing contracts.
Id. at Art. 28.
342. See Straus, supra note 301, at 202-03.
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it allows member states to introduce exceptions to the rights conferred
by a patent, Article 30 does impose limits to their legislative freedom.'
In the WTO dispute settlement proceedings, Canada-Patent Pro-
tection of Pharmaceutical Products, the panel had the opportunity to
interpret the restrictions under Articles 27, 28 and 30 of the TRIPS
Agreement. At the heart of the proceedings were the regulatory review
and the stockpiling exception codified in § 55(2) Canadian Patent Act.
The regulatory review exception of § 55(2) No. 1 Canadian Patent Act
was similar to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), as it allowed for the production,
use and sale of a patented invention when used solely for the purpose of
producing or submitting information required for the approval of the
product.i 5 The stockpiling exception of § 55(2) No. 2 Canadian Patent
Act let the third-party produce, use and stockpile patented pharmaceuti-
cally-active substances during the last six months of the patent term; the1 46
commercial sale of these products was prohibited.
Canada conceded that these provisions conflicted with Article 28 of
the TRIPS Agreement, but maintained that the exceptions were admissi-
ble under Article 30.347 It argued that the stockpiling exception permitted
only limited actions by third parties and did not threaten the ordinary
exploitation of the patent, as commercial competition would not be al-
343. See infra text accompanying notes 344-369. See also NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO,
THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 304-06 (2005); Straus, Implications of TRIPS, supra
note 301, at 203.
344. Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DSI 4/R (Mar. 17, 2000) available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/
cases e/dsl 14_e.htm. For general information on dispute settlement proceedings, see Sigrid
Dtrmer, Dispute Settlement and New Developments Within the Framework of TRIPS-An
Interim Review, 31 IIC 1 (2000); Sue Ann Mota, TRIPS-Five Years of Disputes at the WTO, 17
ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 533 (2000).
345. Section 55.(2)( 1) of the Canadian Patent Act states:
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct, use or sell
the patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information required under any law of Canada, a province or a coun-
try other than Canada that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of
any product.
Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 55.2(1) (1985).
346. Section 55.2(2) of the Canadian Patent Act stated:
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person who makes, constructs, uses or
sells a patented invention in accordance with subsection (1) to make, construct or
use the invention, during the applicable period provided for by the regulations, for
the manufacture and storage of articles intended for sale after the date on which the
term of the patent expires.
Patent Act, R.S.C. , ch. P-A, § 55.2(2) (1985) (repealed 2001);
Panel Report, supra note 344 at 2. 1.
347. Panel Report, supra note 344, at 4.9-.21.
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lowed to enter the market prior to the end of the patent term.348 Further-
more, the exceptions were warranted in view of the goal of Articles 8(2)
and 40 of the TRIPS Agreement to ensure unfettered competition as
soon as possible after the expiration of the patent.349 Canada furthermore
maintained that Articles 7 and 8(1) of the TRIPS Agreement permit the
restriction of the rights and duties of a patentee for the public good and
to ensure an affordable health care system.35° Countering these proposi-
tions, the EU and the member states argued that the stockpiling
exemption violated Article28(1) and 33 of the TRIPS Agreement be-
cause it effectively reduced the patent term for pharmaceuticals to
nineteen and a half years.35' Furthermore, they maintained that the provi-
sion violated the non-discrimination requirement of Article 27(1),
because pharmaceutical patents would be treated differently from "ordi-
nary" patents with respect to the effective patent term3 2 and the
permissible uses of the invention during the patent term.353
The panel found the regulatory review exception permissible under
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement but determined that the stockpiling
exception violated Canada's obligation under the TRIPS agreement. 3' 4 It
interpreted Article 30 to incorporate three cumulative limitations, requir-
ing that exceptions (a) must be limited, (b) must not "unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent," and (c) must not "un-
reasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking
account of the legitimate interests of third parties. 359
"Limited exception" connotes a narrow exception which makes only
a "small diminution of the rights in question. 356 Decisive is the extent
the legal rights have been curtailed, not the commercial impact of the
limitation or the number of legal rights impaired.357 The stockpiling ex-
ception completely removed the patentee's right to exclude competitors
from "making" or "using" the patented invention as it neither restricted
the quantity of production nor the market to be served. 38 By eliminating
the possibility of cutting off the supply of competing goods at the source,
the exception abrogated those rights and thus could no longer qualify as
348. Id.
349. Id. 14.14.
350. Id. 4.11-14, 4.21.
351. Id. ' 3.1.I, 4.1-.3.
352. Id.
353. Id. I 3.1.11., 4.4-5.
354. Id. 8.1.
355. Id. I 7.20-21.
356. Id. 17.30.
357. Id. [ 7.31-.35.
358. Id. 7.34.
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"limited exception."" 9 Neither the limitation to the last six months of the
patent term, which was deemed a commercially significant period of
time; nor its limitation to entities which benefited from the regulatory
review exception and to products which required regulatory approval
could change the "limited exception" analysis, as the impact on each
affected patent has to be considered, not the impact on patents as a
whole. 6
However, regarding to the regulatory review exception, the panel
concluded that the legal rights of the patent owner were curtailed only to
a narrow extent, thus constituting a "limited exception." It stated that
[a]s long as the exception is confined to conduct needed to com-
ply with the requirements of the regulatory approval process, the
extent of the acts unauthorized by the right holder that are per-
mitted by it will be small and narrowly bounded. Even though
regulatory approval processes may require substantial amounts
of test production to demonstrate reliable manufacturing, the
patent owner's rights themselves are not impaired any further by
the size of such production runs, as long as they are solely for
regulatory purposes and no commercial use is made of resulting
final products.362 (emphasis added)
The panel further defined "normal exploitation" of a patent as the right
to "exclude all forms of competition that could detract significantly from
the economic returns anticipated from a patent's grant of market exclu-
sivity" during the patent term. 63 Consequently, as only testing (and not
the sale) of the pharmaceutical compounds was allowed, the panel saw
no conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent.
Finally, the panel defined "legitimate interests" as being broader
than "legal interests"364 and encompassing those interests which "are
359. Id. 1 7.36.
360. Especially in view of the absence of limitations with regard to quantity and market
destination of the products. Id. 7.37.
361. Id. 7.37. The limitation regarding entities benefiting from the regulatory review
exception does not exclude any competitors, as anyone intending to market a generic drug
would have to undergo the drug approval process and thus would qualify under the exception.
That the limitation is only for "products subject to regulatory approval" and did not apply to
other products was deemed irrelevant for the analysis under Article 30 TRIPS as the impact on
each affected patent has to be considered. Id.
362. Id. 17.45.
363. Id. 7.55. Economic returns during an additional period of market exclusivity after
the expiration of the patent as a result of delayed competition due to a mandatory regulatory
approval process do not fall under the "normal exploitation." Such exclusivity is not purposely
conferred by the patent right but is an unintended consequence of the conjunction of patent
law and regulatory laws. Id. 1 7.57.
364. Id. 17.71.
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supported by relevant public policies or other social norms. 3 6' The pat-
entee's interest in market exclusivity after the statutory patent term as
"compensation" for the loss of effective patent duration due to regulatory
approval processes was not recognized as a "legitimate interest" because
such an extension was not a generally accepted legal principle.6 The
provision already reflects the objectives and principles of Articles 7 and
8 of the TRIPS Agreement and cannot be interpreted as allowing the
countries to re-negotiate the careful balance achieved in the TRIPS
Agreement.
Under the panel's interpretation, it seems clear that an extension of a
clinical trial exception to the use of research tools would violate Articles
28(1) and 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. The exclusionary right of owners
of research tool patents would be significantly curtailed because its use
for research purposes (i.e. the primary, if not the sole application of such
an invention) would be exempt from the patent right. Consequently, the
limitation can hardly be considered limited. Compared to the situation
reviewed by the WTO panel, extending the exemption would allow the
use of the invention for its original patented purpose and conflict with
the normal patent exploitation purpose, if not make it impossible. A judi-
cial or legislative construction of the exception which would eviscerate
the patent right would contradict the decision to grant patents for such
technologies in the first place.16 The conferral of the patent right makes
the patentee's interest in exploiting his invention during the patent term a
legitimate interest. Furthermore, as discussed supra, the patentee's inter-
est is not outweighed by the public interest in accessing research tools
because maintaining the incentives for the creation of research tools is
beneficial, if not vital, for a potential user of research tools and for re-
search as such. 69
365. Id. 17.69
366. Id. 7.68-.83. Though several nations (e.g. European Communities, the U.S.,
Japan, Australia, Switzerland and Israel. Countries) had compensated the patentee by creating
a period of market exclusivity or through a restoration of the patent term, other countries
(Canada, Poland, Thailand, Argentina and Hungary) had refrained from doing so despite hav-
ing a regulatory review exception. Consequently, the panel refrained from adjudicating a
politically still unresolved policy issue by recognizing this interest as legitimate in the mean-
ing of Article 30(l) of the TRIPS Agreement. Id. 1 7.77-.79.
367. See Panel report in the dispute settlement proceedings. Id. 7.26.
368. HOLZAPFEL, EXPERIMENTAL USE, supra note 152, at 311.
369. Supra Part VII.B. See also HOLZAPFEL, EXPERIMENTAL USE, supra note 152, at
311; Ducor, supra note 262, at 1028.
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b. Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement
The impact of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement is slightly less
clear. Article 27 prohibits, inter alia, discrimination in the granting of
patents for technology. Article 27(1) reads:
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in
all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application. Subject
to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and para-
graph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of inven-
tion, the field of technology and whether products are imported
or locally produced 7 ° (emphasis added).
Articles 65(4) and 70(8) of the TRIPS Agreement, which provide
transitional periods for developing countries,37 ' and the exclusions from
patentability under Article 27(3) are not relevant to the present issue as
370. Paragraphs 2 and 3, permitting the contracting states to deviate from the general
prohibition of discrimination, allow exclusions from patentability only and thus do not impact
the scope of rights conferred by a patent. They read:
Article 27(l):...
(2): Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre
public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to
avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not
made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.
(3): Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or
animals.
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and
microbiological processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection
of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by
any combination thereof....
For the rationale and negotiation history of these provisions, see generally Pires de Carvalho,
supra note 343, at 205-18, Gervais, supra note 339, at 222-25 (marginal notes 2.261-.265),
and Charles M. McManis, Patenting Genetic Products and Processes: A TRIPS Perspective, in
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 79 (F. Scott Kieff, ed.
2003).
371. The referenced provisions allowed developing countries to delay the introduction of
product protection for technical fields where it had not been available under the national law
(Art. 65(4)) and establishes the "mail-box" system for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemi-
cal products (Art. 70(8)). For the negotiating history, see Pires de Carvalho, supra note 343, at
165-68.
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they do not allow for an exception to the prohibition of discrimination
with regard to the rights conferred by a patent. The panel in the dispute
settlement proceedings Canada-Protection of Pharmaceutical Products
did not rule on whether a limitation of the regulatory review exception to
pharmaceuticals actually violates the non-discrimination clause because
it decided the case based on procedural issues and not on an interpreta-
tion of substantive law. 373 The panel has, however, clarified that the
prohibition against discrimination based on the field of technology also
applies to exceptions under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement.
374
An extension of the experimental use doctrine to research tools
would unduly favor the use of an invention in research over the use of an
invention for other purposes and would no longer be technology-
neutral.375 Research tool technologies would be considerably disadvan-
taged compared to other technologies because the patentee would be
unable to prevent their normal exploitation by third parties, thus eviscer-
ating their commercial value.376 Such an extension would arguably be
contrary to Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, as patent rights would
no longer guarantee an equal opportunity of commercial exploitation
across all fields of technology. This discriminatory treatment would be
even more pronounced under the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor provision
372. The provisions allow for an exception to non-discrimination with regard to pat-
entable subject matter only. The exclusion of diagnostic methods for the treatment of humans
should, in principle, not apply to research tools, as their primary purpose is the use in labora-
tories to gather information, even if they may be used in diagnostics. For an interpretation of
the corresponding EPC provision Article52(4) (as in effect 1973), see the decision of the
Enlarged Board of Appeal, G 1/04--Diagnostic Methods, 2006 O.J. Eur. Pat. Off. 331 (allow-
ing patentability if the diagnostic step is not performed on the human body but can be
performed in a laboratory). The U.S. Congress did not introduce an exception from patentabil-
ity for these methods but chose to immunize medical practitioners and health care providers
through 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1).
373. The panel first distinguished two different possibilities of discrimination: de jure
discrimination, resulting from explicit different treatment, and de facto discrimination, as a
result of identical treatment of different circumstances. It rejected the allegation of an de jure
discrimination, determining that the EU did not present sufficient evidence that the exception
was limited to pharmaceuticals because the wording of the statute extended its application to
all products subject to market approval requirements. Likewise, it rejected the contention of a
defacto discrimination because the EU did not present systematic information to substantiate
its allegation that the provision "in effect" only applied to pharmaceutical patents despite it
broad wording. See WT/DS/l 14/R, 7.99-.102. However, while the panel did not decide
based on substantive law, some language in the report suggests that it viewed a defacto appli-
cation of the de jure broad regulatory review exception only to the field of pharmaceuticals as
discriminatory. Id. T 7.104 ("So long as the broader application is not a sham, the legislation
cannot be considered discriminatory.").
374. Id. [ 7.91.
375. HOLZAPFEL, EXPERIMENTAL USE, supra note 152, at 331.
376. See supra notes 274-275 and accompanying text.
Spring 20081
436 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 14:367
because it is further limited to the group of research tools used in drug
17development processes.
VIII. BORDERLINE CASES
Having established the general principle that the use of research
tools should not be exempted under (any) experimental use exemption, it
is readily apparent that there are some borderline cases that arguably
warrant a different evaluation. The general principle stands in the case of
research tools that the user cannot or only under great difficulties manu-
facture herself, can be best obtained from the patentee or his licensee,
and-once they have been bought-can be used continuously as a result
of exhaustion of the patent rights, e.g., a laboratory microscope or the
Free Electron Laser used at Duke University.3 7 The same must apply
where a laboratory commercially exploits a patented method for detect-
ing a specific compound or specific characteristics of a compound.379
However, in some situations it is difficult to ascertain whether the ex-
periment is solely directed at obtaining information about the patented
invention or used to gather information about other compounds as well.
A. Overlapping Inventive Concepts-Merck v. Integra
Judge Rader correctly qualified two of Integra's asserted patents as
being directed to research tools. 380 Consequently, applying the same dis-
tinction adopted in this Article, he argues that the two patents should
have been held to be infringed and appropriate damages should be
awarded to the patentee."" Nevertheless, the specific facts of this case
could constitute one of the borderline cases where policy considerations
warrant an exception permitting the use of the research tools.
Claim 4 of the '237 patent claims:
A method for detaching animal cells from a substrate to which
they are bound in an Arg-Gly-Asp mediated manner, comprising
contacting said bound cells with a solution containing non-
naturally occurring peptide consisting essentially of the amino
377. HOLZAPFEL, EXPERIMENTAL USE, supra note 152, at 331. See generally Eisenberg,
supra note 172, at 225 (pointing out that individual areas of technology should not be left
without adequate patent protection).
378. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958
(2003).
379. Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 14.
380. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck 1), 496 E3d 1334, 1350-52
(Rader, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
381. Id. at 1349.
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acid sequence Arg-Gly-Asp-Y, wherein Y is any amino acid such
that the peptide has cell-detachment activity. (emphasis added)
The only claim of the other research tool patent, the '734 patent
reads:
A substantially purified cell surface receptor derived from mes-
enchymal tissue and capable of binding to a peptide containing
the amino acid sequence Arg-Gly-Asp, comprising a glycopro-
tein composed of at least two polypeptides of about 115 and 125
kD, respectively, as determined by SDS-PAGE under reducing
conditions which selectively binds to vitronectin, but not to fi-
bronectin."3 ' (emphasis added)
Since the '237 patent claims methods for detaching cells from an
animal substrate, and the '734 claims a surface receptor, both inventions
are research tools because they can only be used in a laboratory to con-
duct further research. 384 Both patents are directed at compounds or
methods that could not possibly be subject to FDA approval. Thus, they
cannot benefit from the safe harbor of § 27 1 (e)( 1 ).385 Nonetheless, use of
the patented methods should be exempted under § 271(e)(1) if the pat-
ented methods must be used during experiments on the patented RGD-
peptide that are required for FDA-approval processes, lest the purpose of
the Hatch-Waxman Act would be defeated.
In the present case, all four patents are directed either at specific
types of RGD-peptides or at methods involving specific uses of those
RGD-peptides; all four of these inventions are directed at or directly re-
late to the RGD-peptides' cell adhesion properties. Scripps' and
Merck's experiments are directed at obtaining the necessary information
for the drug approval process of their cyclic RGD-peptide EMD 121974,
whose therapeutic value lies in influencing (blocking) the cell adhesion
382. U.S. Patent No. 4,879,237 (filed May 24, 1985).
383. U.S. Patent No. 4,789,734 (filed Aug. 6, 1985).
384. Merck II, 486 E3d at 1350-52 (Rader J., dissenting).
385. Id. at 1350-53.
386. Cf, e.g., Claim I of the '997 patent: "A method of altering cell attachment activity
of cells, comprising: contacting the cells with a substantially pure soluble peptide including
RGDX where X is an amino acid and the peptide has cell attachment activity." (emphasis
added); Claim 8 of the '525 patent: "A substantially pure peptide including as the cell-
attachment-promoting constituent the amino acid sequence Arg-Gly-Arg-R wherein R is Ser,
Cys, Thr or other amino acid, said peptide having cell-attachment-promoting activity, and said
peptide not being a naturally occurring peptide." (emphasis added); Claim 4 of the '237 pat-
ent: "A method for detaching animal cells from a substrate to which they are bound in an Arg-
Gly-Asp mediated manner...." (emphasis added); Claim I of the '734 patent: "A substan-
tially purified cell surface receptor derived from mesenchymal tissue and capable of binding
to a peptide containing the amino acid sequence Arg-Gly-Asp ... "(emphasis added).
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process. It would defeat the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act if ex-
periments on the RGD-peptides, which are exempted from infringing the
'525 and the '997 patents due to the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1), would
nevertheless infringe the '237 patent and the '734 patent and could be
enjoined by the patentee when they are all directed at the very character-
istics that make the compound a (potential) drug candidate. If that were
the case, any reasonably skilled patent drafter would be able to prevent
generic drug manufacturers from using the safe harbor provision.
Whenever a molecule with potential therapeutic properties is discov-
ered, the inventor will aim to receive a patent covering the molecule as
well as potential useful applications (hereinafter referred to as the
"molecule patent"; e.g. the '525). To prevent competitors from benefiting
from the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) in the future, an inventor will apply
for an additional patent (hereinafter referred to as the "research tool pat-
ent") covering methods for conducting laboratory experiments with the
molecule; the claims will be directed to methods on the physiological
process which confers the therapeutic value to the molecule. The
claims will be drafted in such way that anyone intending to conduct the
experiments for FDA approval would have to make use of the method
claimed in the research tool patent (such as, e.g. the '274 patent). In
principle, the method patent does not confer any additional protection as
compared to the molecule patent when the method is limited to uses of
the molecule claimed in the other patent, as in Integra v. Merck. How-
ever, it could be used to attain a de facto extension of the patent term by
enjoining clinical testing of the molecule, which would come back full
circle to the scenario the Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to rectify.
This should apply just the same as when a research tool patent has been
filed years after the molecule patent when both patents are owned by the
same entity."' If the safe harbor is extended only to the exception dis-
cussed above, this would prevent the circumvention of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, while not inappropriately disadvantaging the patentee be-
387. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck 1I), 496 F3d 1334, 1344-45
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
388. The drafting of two applications would not conflict with the prohibition of double
patenting under § 101 as the claims would be directed to different categories of patentable
subject matter. See Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. N. Petrochemical Co., 784 F.2d 351,
355 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1028 (1986) ("Our predecessor court
refused to find double patenting based, variously, on differences in claimed subject matter; on
different statutory classes; on the existence of non-infringing uses; on differences in the
breadth of the claims; and on the absence of 'cross-reading' (whether the claims of one patent
can be infringed without infringing the other).").
389. The author notes that the factual situation would be considerably different where the
ownership of the research tool patent and molecule patent diverge and reserves judgment on
the best resolution of such situations.
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cause no additional commercial value (beyond the value of the patent
itself) is conferred to the clinical testers during the patent term.
The proposed resolution of the Merck v. Integra facts extends an ar-
gument that Holzapfel made with respect to a hypothetical situation
where a patent contains claims directed at a molecule and its correspond-
ing gene sequence.9° When the molecule is produced and used in
experiments to further research its biological activity and suitability for
therapeutic purposes, the experiments are exempted under the general
principle-that is, permitting research on and prohibiting research with a
patented invention-as they are directed at obtaining information about
the molecule.9 Using the DNA sequence for the sole purpose of produc-
ing the molecule would, in principle, not be exempted because such uses
are not directed at obtaining information on the DNA sequence or on the
molecule. However, when such claims are contained in the same patent
application, the concept of unity of invention embedded in Article 84 of
the EPC, Section 34 GPA requires the claims to be directed to the same
invention. It is recognized under European and German law that final
products, processes for the production, and intermediate products consti-S • 393
tute only a single, uniform invention. Consequently, as the claims must
relate to the same invention, the experimentation on the subject of any
one claim, i.e. the molecule, should be allowed to make use of any proc-
ess, method, compounds claimed in any other claim of the patent:9
The concept of unity of invention is embedded in the international
patent system through Article 3(4)(iii) of the Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT) and has been adopted by several countries for their domestic pro-
ceedings.39 Rule 13.1 of the PCT Regulations defines unity of invention as
"a group of inventions so linked as to form a single general inventive con-
cept.' 396 Under Rule 13.2, this concept requires a "technical relationship
390. Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 16 (Scenario 5).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. BGH [German Federal Court of Justice], Case X ZB 2/73, GRUR 1974, 774 Alka-
lidiamidophosphite (June 26, 1974); EPO [European Patent Office] Board of Appeal, T 57/82,
GRUR INT. 1982, 747 Copolycarbonates/BAYER (Apr. 29, 1982), http://legal.european-
patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/t820057epl.htm; Schulte, in Schulte, supra note 149, § 34 mar-
ginal note 260; Keukenschrijver, in Busse, supra note 149, § 34 marginal note 124. See
Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 16.
394. Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 16.
395. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231,
available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf. See generally Jay Erstling & Isabelle
Boutillon, The Patent Cooperation Treaty: At the Center of the International Patent System, 32
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1583 (2006).
396. Regulations Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, Rule 13.1, June 19, 1970, 28
U.N.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter PCT Regulations], available at
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct-regs.pdf.
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among those inventions involving one or more of the same or corre-
sponding special technical features," where the special features must lay
in what each of the invention contributes over the prior invention .
While U.S. patent law follows the restriction practice under § 121 for
their domestic proceedings, it applies the unity of invention concept
when acting in its PCT capacity.399 In that regard, 37 C.F.R. 1.475(b)
clarifies that the requirement may also be satisfied where claims are di-
rected to different categories of statutory subject matter."
The Merck v. Integra situation differs markedly from Judge Rader's
hypothetical, where a university professor invents a highly useful re-
search tool with the sole purpose of testing the effectiveness of other
compounds in fighting cancer.0 ' In his hypothetical, the inventor found a
research tool with a broad application. Since the invention was not lim-
ited to a particular group of compounds (like RGD-peptides), the
research tool and the compound undergoing experimentation could not
be viewed as a uniform invention or as having a similar relationship.
Furthermore, contrary to the situation in Integra v. Merck, the patented
screening method does not have to be used in FDA mandated experi-
ments. If it were the most effective method, it would indeed be a
397. See supra note 396, PCT Regulations, at Rule 13.2.
398. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2002). See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.142. Requirement for restriction:
"(a) If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in a single application, the
examiner in an Office action will require the applicant in the reply to that action to elect an
invention to which the claims will be restricted, this official action being called a requirement
for restriction (also known as a requirement for division)... "
399. 35 U.S.C. § 372(b)(2) (2000); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.475-.477, 1.488-.489, 1.499 (2005).
See also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Manual of Patent Exami-
nation Procedure 1850, 1875, 1893.03.d (8th ed. 2001, latest revision Sept. 2007), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/.
400. 37 C.F.R. § 1.475(b) provides:
An international or a national stage application containing claims to different cate-
gories of invention will be considered to have unity of invention if the claims are
drawn only to one of the following combinations of categories:
(1) A product and a process specially adapted for the manufacture of said product;
or
(2) A product and process of use of said product; or
(3) A product, a process specially adapted for the manufacture of the said product,
and a use of the said product; or
(4) A process and an apparatus or means specifically designed for carrying out the
said process; or
(5) A product, a process specially adapted for the manufacture of the said product,
and an apparatus or means specifically designed for carrying out the said process.
401. Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck 11), 496 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (Rader, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
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researcher's preferred choice; however, other, albeit less effective, meth-
ods will be available for testing so that a defacto extension of the patent
term will not occur.4°2
B. Simultaneous Gathering of Information on Tool and Compound
Some biotechnological research tools are used in experiments to
gather information on how a certain molecule interacts with another. Ex-
periments with a patented research tool on a potential drug candidate
will simultaneously produce information on both the compound under
experimentation and on the research tool. 40 3 For example, a screening
with a receptor will yield information on the molecules binding to the
receptor and about the binding characteristics of the receptor itself; simi-
larly, screening with pharmaceutically active compounds for analogues
will yield information both on the analogues and on the biologically ac-
tive regions of the patented molecule. Consequently, it has been argued
that the distinction between "research on" and "research with" no longer
allows a distinction in such cases because the experiments will also, at
the very least, yield information that relates to the subject matter of the
invention-the research tool. 4°4 While this argument certainly can be
made, it is solely results-based and neglects the purpose of the respective
experiments. Where the experiments are directed at obtaining informa-
tion about another molecule, the research tool is nevertheless used
according to its technical teaching, whose commercial exploitation has
been allocated to the patentee by virtue of the patent grant.
1. Pure Research Tools
Permitting the use of pure research tools-such as a receptor-for
experiments under the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) would allow third par-
ties to exploit the sole commercial application of the patented technical
teaching. Consequently, the patent's value would be destroyed and the
patent grant would be rendered a facade. As the application of the patent
laws is meant not to eviscerate the incentive and reward function of the
• 40-5
patent system, such a practice should not be permitted.
402. As suggested above, allowing access to any research tool would diminish the incen-
tive to design around existing patents and invent innovative new methods. See supra note 277
and accompanying text.
403. Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 14-16.
404. Alan W. White, Problems of Patents for Research Tools, 4 BIOSCIENCE L. REV. 138
(1998/1999); Bernhard Fischer, Germany: Reach-through Claims and Experimental Use,
MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Supplement-IP Strategy Yearbook 2001, at 10. But see
HOLZAPFEL, EXPERIMENTAL USE, supra note 152, at 328-29.
405. See Merck 11, 496 F.3d, at 1352 (Rader, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-
part) (providing a hypothetical); see supra notes 401-402 and accompanying text. Cf.
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2. Dual Purpose Research Tools
When the patented invention is a dual-purpose research tool, the
economic impact on the patent owner is considerably different. Consider
the situation where the patent is directed at a pharmaceutically active
molecule; its use for screening purposes is disclosed but not explicitly
claimed.4 ° When the molecule is used for screening purposes, the ex-
periments will produce information on both the molecule and potential
receptors. Compared to pure research tools, the commercial value of the
patent will not be completely diminished as the screening does not affect
the use of the molecule for therapeutical purposes. Nevertheless, the pat-
entee would be deprived of the opportunity to commercialize its use for
screening. This approach (hereinafter, the "value impact test") suggests
that the exemption should be extended to situations when the incursion
on the patent right would be negligible when compared to the much
more lucrative market for therapeutic purposes and justifiable in out-
weighing public interests.407 This should be the case even where the
patented molecule is used in screening for analogues which are them-
selves intended to be submitted for drug approval and marketed as
competing drugs.4 °8
Only where the pharmaceutically active molecule is used for screen-
ing as part of industrially manufactured test kits, e.g. to screen cells to
verify the existence of certain receptors, could one no longer faithfully
argue that information on the molecule is being collected, and thus, such
uses should not be exempted under the experimental use exception.409
The value impact test essentially results in a distinction based on the
extent of the encroachment on the patent right, i.e., how much would the
value of the patent be diminished by allowing the experiments. The test
would allow the use of the technical teaching in research where the pat-
ent has an additional application so that its value would not be
completely eliminated. However, it is not clear how the test would treat
Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 14 (with regard to the use of a receptor for
screening).
406. Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 15.
407. Id. (Scenario 2) Holzapfel recognized that such extension would not be conforming
to the European patent law doctrine of absolute product protection; nevertheless, they are to be
accepted because that doctrine should be considered in relation to the experimental use ex-
emption. Id. at 12-13. Under that doctrine, the scope of a patent for a product extends to all
uses of the product, whether they have been disclosed in the patent or not. See BGH [German
Federal Court of Justice], GRUR 1972, 541-Imidazoline (Mar. 14, 2003); EPO [European
Patent Office], Enlarged Board of Appeal, G2/88 Friction Reducing Additive/MOBIL OIL III,
1990 O.J. EPO 093, 110 (Dec. 11, 1989); EPO [European Patent Office], Technical Board of
Appeal, T 80/96 L-Carnitin/LONZA, O.J. EPO 2000, 50, 54 (June 16, 1999). See also Keu-
kenschrijver, in Busse, supra note 149, § 9 marginal note 51.
408. Holzapfel, Research Tools, supra note 154, at 15 (Scenario 3).
409. Id.
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the hypothetical situation when a molecule is used for screening where
both the molecule and screening process have been disclosed and
claimed in the patent.4 It would seem that the test would allow the use
of a pharmaceutically-active molecule for screening purposes (even
though the screening process is claimed) because it would only have a
very limited impact on the value of the patent. 41 Assuming, arguendo, in
an extension of the hypothetical, that several years later the claim on the
molecule is invalidated and only the claim for the use of the molecule in
the screening process remains. At this point, the use permitted just be-
fore the invalidation of the claim to the molecule would be prohibited,
leading to the untenable result that a narrowing of the scope of a patent
would permit the owner to enjoin acts which were theretofore covered
under the experimental use exemption. Similar inconsistencies result
when considering the opposite situation: the sole application of a pat-
ented molecule in research, which should be treated identically to pure
research tools, i.e. the scenario with the patented receptor, 4 2 and thus no
use in research should be allowed under this differentiation. Why should
the outcome change only because the molecule is later discovered to be
useful in therapeutic application, and when an exemption for screening
purposes would be only a relatively limited encroachment on the patent's
value?
Ultimately, a case-by-case determination based on how far exemp-
tions on the use of the research tool would diminish the economic value
of the patent is impractical and would yield inconsistent results. Fur-
thermore, it would contradict patent policy because the patent is granted,
not based on the commercial value of the invention, but on the fulfill-
ment of patentability requirements which have no correlation to the
commercial value. The general rule must remain that the use of a re-
search tool for research purposes, i.e. according to its technical teaching,
should not be exempted even when dual-purpose research tools are used.
Where information is simultaneously obtained on both the research tool
and the compound under experimentation, the decisive inquiry must not
be into the effects the exemption would have on the value of the patent.
410. Holzapfel's first scenario involves screening for possible ligands with a patented
receptor, which does not have a second application in therapy (prohibited); his second sce-
nario involves a patent for a pharmaceutically-active compound where its use for screening is
disclosed, but not claimed (permitted); his third scenario involves screening with a patented
molecule where a therapeutic application has been disclosed (permitted). Id. at 14-15.
411. It would be different from the first scenario as the molecule-unlike the receptor in
the hypothetical-has a further therapeutic application. The difference with the second sce-
nario is that the patent explicitly claims the screening method-which, in view of the German
doctrine of absolute product protection confers protection beyond the claim to the compound
itself. Id.
412. See supra Part VIII.B. 1.
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Rather, the following question has to be asked and answered: What were
the experiments directed at: the gathering of information about the re-
search tool or about another compound?
C. Applying the Distinction
It has not escaped this author's attention that the determination of
the purpose requires a subjective inquiry. The proposal for a subjective
inquiry may seem untimely when other inquiries into other subjective
elements required for the establishment of the first-inventor priority, for
determining whether the best mode requirement has been met or the in-
fringer has acted willfully, have been criticized as creating superfluous
litigation and have been subject to proposals for reform.413 However, the
determination of the subjective element is remarkably different in the
present scenario, and much easier to administer in court. In these inquir-
ies, it is the defendant who alleges that the patentee did not disclose the
best mode, and the patentee who alleges that the infringement was will-
ful. In both cases, the allegations are brought by the opponent of the
party whose motivation has to be determined.
In the present case, however, it would be the alleged infringer who
would argue that the purpose of his experiments was the obtaining of
information on the patented receptor rather than on the other molecule,
thus necessitating a subjective inquiry into his own motivation, and not
that of the opposing party. As a consequence, an alleged infringer's mo-
tivation for conducting the experiments would be easier to determine as
he himself would have the burden of proof. Although the Federal Circuit
has left open whether the common law experimental use exemption con-
stitutes an exception from the patent scope or a defense against
infringement, it clarified in Madey v. Duke that the alleged infringer
bears the burden of proof when invoking the experimental use excep-
• 414
tion. Likewise, as an affirmative defense, the alleged infringer bears
the burden of establishing the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1). 415
413. The current patent law reform proposal would, inter alia, introduce the first-to-file
system and eliminate the discovery-laden process to establish the conception date; addition-
ally, requirements for finding of willfulness will be objectified. See e.g., The Patent Reform
Act of 2001, H.R. 1908 and S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007).
414. It was referred to as both a defense and as exception by the Federal Circuit in Roche
v. Bolar. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1984). However,
while the Court has rejected the view that it is an affirmative defense which has to be raised in
responsive pleading, it has confirmed that the burden of proof for establishing the defense is
with the defendant, Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
415. As a defense to infringement, the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) has to be pleaded pur-
suant to 35 U.S.C. § 282(4). See Maxon Premix Burner Co. v. Mid-Continent Metal Products.
Co., 279 F. Supp. 164, 190 (N.D. II1. 1967) (defendant has the burden to prove the essential
facts of its affirmative defenses in patent infringement proceedings); Sinclair Refining Co. v.
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It is to be expected that the alleged infringer will try to argue that his
experiments were directed at obtaining information about the research
tool to avoid liability for infringement, and it would be in the ambit of
the court to develop proper standards where an alleged infringer has dis-
charged his burden of proof and submitted enough evidence to benefit
from the common law research exemption or from the safe harbor of
§ 271(e)(1). Similar to evidence required for corroboration of the con-
ception in interference proceedings,46 the alleged defender should be
required to have detailed laboratory notebooks which clearly specify the
purpose of the experiments.
CONCLUSION
The introduction of a broadened experimental use exemption would
not alleviate all, but only part of the perceived problems in biomedical
research by permitting researchers to conduct experiments on patented
subject matter. Access to patented research tools should not be permitted
under either common law exemption or § 271(e)(1) in order to maintain
the necessary incentives for the development of new research tools.
When the distinction between permissible research on an invention and
impermissible research with a research tool may not be easily ascer-
tained in borderline cases because information on both compound and
research tool is obtained, a subjective inquiry in the motivation for the
experiments may be necessary to arrive at an appropriate judicial deter-
mination. There is only limited evidence that research tool owners abuse
patent rights; such evidence is insufficient to outweigh the removal of
incentives for the development of research tools, which would drive out
of business highly innovative companies and could ultimately slow down
the pace of biomedical research. So far, the economic benefits achieved
through widely licensing an invention on reasonably terms seem to pre-
vail. With respect to government-funded research, widespread licensing
of research tools can be facilitated through contractual clauses or by the
Globe Oil & Refining Co., 20 F. Supp. 681, 690 (D.C. Del. 1937), rev'don other grounds 103
F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1939) ("Generally speaking, the defendant must establish its defenses, so
from that point of view the burden of proof is on defendant."). Cf Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 474 F.3d 1281, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Repair is an affirmative defense to a
claim of infringement, and Benun, as the party raising the affirmative defense, had the burden
of establishing this defense .... ").
416. Corroborating evidence for establishment of conception in interference proceedings
can have the form of (a) testimony of a person different from the inventor, who from discus-
sion with the inventor understood the claimed invention at the time it was conceived, or (b) by
documents created at the time of conception. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148
F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Sturtevant v. Van Remortel, No. 93 Civ. 3466(JFK), 1995
WL 611320, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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exercise of march-in rights, which would be a smaller encroachment on
the incentives provided by the patent system.
In individual cases, the strategic behavior of research tool patent
owners may prevent researchers from continuing on a specific research
trajectory. While that is certainly lamentable, it must be accepted to
maintain the incentives of the patent system for research tool owners.
Although there is empirical evidence of a statistically significant prob-
lem of blocking patents in specific areas, there is no evidence that such
blocking patents actually have a negative impact on overall welfare that
would warrant a general exemption on the use of research tools. Extreme
circumstances are better addressed through individual equity considera-
tions, e.g. when a court has to decide on a preliminary or permanent
injunction, than through a general exemption of research tools.
One can hope that the Federal Circuit will clarify that research tools
are not exempted under either exemption following the general distinc-
tion of "experimenting on" versus "experimenting with." Although it
may be presumptuous to hope that the court will reconsider its applica-
tion of the common law exemption and deviate from the narrow holding
in Duke v. Madey to adopt a meaningful experimental use exemption, a
meaningful exemption would also allow for a more consistent (and nar-
row) application of the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor without hindering the
development of innovative drugs. As a consequence of the nature of bio-
technological research, there will presumably be numerous cases in
which the alleged infringer will defend himself by arguing that the ex-
periments were directed at obtaining information on the properties of a
research tool. It will be the responsibility of the Federal Circuit to estab-
lish stringent rules on what evidence must be produced to sustain such
allegation, and for the district courts to apply the subjective inquiry in
trial.
